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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the effects of subsurface forces on security around the 
Korean Peninsula. It looks at the history, order of battle, and past provocations carried 
out by the Korean People’s Navy (KPN) in the undersea environment and the threats 
posed to the South. Then, the thesis looks at the Republic of Korea Navy’s undersea 
vulnerabilities, strategy, and recent responses to the North’s provocations. Finally, the 
thesis explores various ways of integrating technology and possible allied cooperation to 
defend against the relentless provocations from the North. It concludes that integrating 
unmanned underwater vehicles, creating a wide-area surveillance system, and working 
with countries sharing common security interests (including the United States and Japan) 
could significantly improve South Korea’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities by 
providing better indications and warnings of KPN submarine activity in its waters and 
doubling the number of submarines available to manage the North’s large undersea fleet. 
Although many diplomatic and political hurdles need to be addressed before such 
strategic military cooperation could occur, the implications for better managing the 
subsurface domain, not just around the Korean Peninsula, but also in the rest of the 
region, would be significant.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Given advancements in submarine technology, the undersea domain poses a 
difficult problem for the Korean Peninsula. The possibility of conflict triggered by events 
in the undersea domain remains high. A robust South Korean undersea program in 
coordination with the United States could improve security in the subsurface realm and 
strengthen deterrence against a North Korean attack. This thesis will examine the past, 
present, and future direction of submarine forces on the Korean Peninsula and the 
implications for the U.S. Navy. The questions to be examined include the following:  
1. How have North Korean submarine activities affected South Korean 
security programs: specifically, with respect to naval procurement, 
platform improvements, manning, training, procedures, and policies?  
2. What is the role of the two submarine forces in security on the Korean 
Peninsula? 
3. What influence does the U.S. Navy have on the balance of undersea 
forces? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Korean War started on June 25, 1950, and has never officially ended. Since 
the signing of the armistice in 1953, pausing the fighting between the two Koreas, North 
Korea has executed countless provocations against South Korea but never escalated to the 
point of ending the armistice. Since then, many scenarios have presented various ways in 
which the fighting might recommence. The Republic of Korea (ROK) military, in 
conjunction with the United States military, conducts one of the largest combined joint 
military exercises in the world to combat these potential scenarios and test other military 
objectives. The scenarios vary, but the main objective does not: to be ready to defend the 
Republic of Korea if and when the fighting recommences on the Korean Peninsula.  
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North Korea is notorious for its million-man army, which dwarfs the other 
services. Therefore, the most common scenarios on reinitiating the fighting are land 
centric.1 Common scenarios on the Korean Peninsula focus on skirmishes initiated by the 
North Korean army because of the massive buildup of Korean People’s Army (KPA) 
forces near the DMZ.2 For example, on November 23, 2010, North Korea conducted one 
of its most lethal provocations by firing approximately 170 rounds at Yeonpyeong Island, 
killing two ROK Marines and two civilians.3 This incident is a good example of how the 
massive presence of KPA soldiers and artillery around the DMZ could be used to 
recommence the fighting between the two countries. Unfortunately, the provocations are 
not limited to the land.  
Provocations from the North via the West Sea and East Sea have also driven 
tensions high on the Korean Peninsula; however, the most offensive sea-based 
provocation occurred in the West Sea in March of 2010. Republic of Korea Ship (ROKS) 
Cheonan was attacked by a torpedo that ripped the small corvette into two pieces, driving 
her to bottom of the West Sea in minutes.4 An international investigative team, after 
almost six months of study, concluded that a KPN midget submarine shot and sank the 
Cheonan on that infamous night of March 26, 2010, claiming the lives of 46 members of 
her crew.5 Based on emotions expressed at the mass funeral for the sailors that were 
trapped on the ship, it is a miracle that South Korea did not respond militarily to the clear 
act of war committed by the North. This incident alone highlights the dangers posed by 
even the smallest submarine in the North Korean Navy’s order of battle, leaving one to 
wonder what the extent of the KPN’s capabilities to exploit the undersea domain are. 
                                                 
1Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “Understanding the North Korean Military to the Security of the Korean 
Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Declined or Evolved?” Korea Observer 40, no. 1 (2009), 122.  
2Ibid., 123. 
3Andrew Forbes and Yoon Sukjoon, “Old and New Threats from North Korea Against the Republic of 
Korea,” in Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and Challenges, ed. Geoffrey Till and Yoon Sukjoon (Seoul: 
Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, 2011), 36. 
4Ohm Tae-am, “Security Challenges and Policy Dilemmas of South Korea in 2012,” The Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis 24, no. 1 (March 2012), 20. Additionally, I was stationed in Korea at the time 
and remember watching the ship sink on TV. 
5Andrew Forbes and Yoon Sukjoon, “Old and New Threats from North Korea Against the Republic of 
Korea,” in Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and Challenges, ed. Geoffrey Till and Yoon Sukjoon (Seoul: 
Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, 2011), 36. 
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Despite the threat even from relatively low-end diesel submarines, surprisingly few 
studies have been conducted in English that analyze the subsurface threat in the waters 
surrounding the Korean Peninsula. The potential reason for this lack of analysis of the 
subsurface threat may be the limited role the submarines played leading up to the 
Cheonan incident. The smaller North Korean submarines were used for infiltrating the 
South with North Korean special operations forces (SOF) vice conducting destructive 
operations against ROKN forces. 
The main purpose of the North Korean submarine fleet is intended to conduct 
three separate missions: first, to deliver SOF deep behind enemy lines; second, to conduct 
mining operations; and third, to conduct offensive operations against the ROK and U.S. 
surface ships. These missions may continue to be the core of the submarine fleet, but the 
North Koreans have created a new class of submarines to maximize the asymmetric 
advantage they have developed over the South Koreans, nuclear weapons. According to 
one defector who worked as a nuclear technician in the North, the Kim regime 
successfully developed a nuclear bomb in the 1980s.6 It is known to have conducted six 
nuclear tests since 2006. As North Korean nuclear physicists continue the march toward 
full nuclear capabilities, the KPN is working on successfully launching a ballistic missile 
from a domestically built Gorae class diesel submarine, although it is probably a heavily 
modified Russian Golf class submarine.7 It appears as though North Korea was able to 
successfully launch a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on 23 May 2015.8 
The hermit kingdom somehow managed to take a dying submarine program and use it to 
provide a credible threat to not just South Korea, but all of its neighbors in the region, 
stirring the international community into a frenzy. 
The single example of the lethal blow delivered by a beat-up low-end North 
Korean submarine in the complex shallow water environment of the West Sea should 
                                                 
6Jasper Becker, “Building the Bomb: North Korean Exiles Reveal 15-Year History of Nuclear 
Cheating,” The Independent,11 February 2004.  
7Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Karl Dewey, “North Korea Modernises Submarine Fleet,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 9 February 2016, 6.  
8Karl Dewey, “North Korea Conducts SLBM Launch,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 53, no. 25 (2016), 
ProQuest ID: 1784018419. 
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serve as a calling to the South to expend the time and energy to better understand the 
threats and impacts the subsurface domain could have on the security of the Korean 
Peninsula. There is a good chance that North Korea may resort to using undersea 
platforms to destabilize the security situation on Korean Peninsula. The ROK Navy’s 
submarine force is extremely capable and technologically advanced compared to the 
KPN, but it has significantly fewer vessels and physically unable to stop all of KPN’s 
submarines from making past the Northern Limit Line (NLL). Additionally, the 
asymmetric threat posed by the inferior KPN, if not properly defended against, could and 
would cause significant damage, as evidenced by the somber loss of the ROKS Cheonan.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Military stability is the number one concern of hundreds of thousands of soldiers 
on both sides of the de-militarized zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula. Contrary to the 
name, for over 60 years, young South and North Korean men, as well as U.S. and UN 
troops, have stood guard along the world’s most heavily fortified border. A relic of the 
Cold War, the two Koreas were thrust into war when Kim Il Sung attacked the South on 
June 25, 1950, in hopes of uniting the country under communist control with the backing 
of the Soviets and Chinese.9 Unfortunately, for Kim Il Sung, the United States was 
committed to preventing the Korean Peninsula from falling into communist hands. 
Following three years of combat, the fighting came to a standstill, eventually leading to 
an armistice. Although an armistice was signed on July 27,1953, the North continues 
periodic provocations for various reasons, ranging from blackmailing the international 
community for food and aid to establishing legitimacy for its new leader. Now, as one of 
the most isolated countries in the world, North Korea is infamous for its million-man 
army, armada of submarines, fortified artillery batteries along the DMZ, nuclear weapons 
program, and a whole string of provocations against the South.  
The Korean War has been on pause for over 60 years, and one of the questions 
that comes up over and over again is how the fighting might recommence. One most 
                                                 
9Warren I. Cohen, “Diplomacy Needed to Prevent the Next Korean War,” The Sun (Baltimore), 31 
July 1994.  
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common theory in the existing literature is that the North Korea’s main effort will be 
centered on the army coming across the DMZ. A study by Jim Dorschner in 2013 
explains the purpose of the combined operational plan: “South Korean and U.S. military 
planning, as detailed in OPLAN 5027 which outlines the defence of South Korea, is 
based on the assumption of a large-scale, surprise North Korean invasion across the 
DMZ.”10 Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., in his article “Understanding the North Korean Military 
Threat to the Security of the Korean Peninsula” lists the firepower the North Koreans 
have built up around the DMZ in preparation for a land battle that will ensue at some 
point in the future, including the stationing of “more than 70 percent of its active forces 
within 90 miles of the DMZ.”11 This heavily fortified arrangement by the North along the 
DMZ is the basis for OPLAN 5027, assuming a surprise attack by the KPA. By placing a 
large number of its army closer to the DMZ, the shorter distance required to travel by the 
KPA will also aid the surprise attack by shortening the response time the South will have 
upon recognition of an attack.12 An August 1, 1994, article in Jane’s Defence Weekly 
perfectly captures the presumed land-centric North Korean Army’s thought process: 
Tactically, the guiding principles of the North Korea Army are: 
Annihilation of the enemy—to destroy the defending US/South Korean 
forces in situ, before they have an opportunity to react; Surprise attack—
by using unconventional means of deployment to attack the US/South 
Korean forces in an unexpected manner, giving the allies little chance to 
counter-attack. Overwhelming fire power—by using multiple rocket 
launchers, long-range artillery, short-range battlefield rockets and other 
systems, thus allowing armored formations to crush the allied defences.13 
It is understandable why a majority of the literature focuses on battles on land with the 
type of analysis provided. Nevertheless, North Korea’s newly developed missiles, nuclear 
weapons, and maritime excursions provide other avenues to conflict. 
                                                 
10Jim Dorschner, “Back from the Brink—Conflict Scenarios On the Korean Peninsula,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 16 May 2013, 8. 
11Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “Understanding the North Korean Military to the Security of the Korean 
Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Declined or Evolved?” Korea Observer 40, no. 1 (2009), 122–3.  
12Ibid., 128.  
13“North Korea: If the Flashpoint Becomes War Global Update,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 August 
1994. 
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One area of major concern affecting the security of not just the Korean Peninsula 
but also the entire region is the emergence of nuclear weapons. Kim Il Sung started North 
Korea on its path toward creating a nuclear weapons program. Recent nuclear tests 
conducted by the North leave little to doubt the North’s success in developing a nuclear 
bomb. Recent tests conducted in 2015 and 2016 suggest credible evidence of North 
Korean achievements in developing a functional nuclear bomb. A nuclear North has 
significant implications for the defense of the ROK. North Korean media claims the 
following for its purpose in pursuing nuclear weapons: the “North Korean nuclear 
deterrent is ‘not a plaything to be put on the negotiating table, as it is the essential means 
to protect its sovereignty and vital rights from the U.S. nuclear threat and hostile policy, 
which have lasted for more than half a century.’”14 This very well could be the case, but 
significant doubt exists on the North’s restraint to not resort to its nuclear arsenal against 
a more technologically advanced South during a conflict. Furthermore, Brad Roberts 
proposes a more likely scenario where North Korea would rely on its nuclear weapons to 
conduct “nuclear blackmail” for the sake of obtaining political concessions.15 Others, like 
Paul Davis et al., postulate on the military balance on the Korean Peninsula: “In looking 
at the Korean Peninsula today it is clear that most trends favor South Korea, but that 
North Korea’s nuclear program is a great concern. Although war remains unlikely, it—
even a limited nuclear war—is imaginable in the years ahead.”16 The question that needs 
to be asked then is when would the North decide to use its nuclear weapons if it decided 
to go to war? Using nuclear weapons at the onset of the conflict would be committing to 
a total war from the beginning, leaving no chances for de-escalation. The close proximity 
of Seoul to the DMZ should also give the North pause prior to resorting to its nuclear 
weapons because, depending on the winds, there is a good chance that some of the fallout 
would drift North. It seems to make the most sense for the North to hold off to the last 
                                                 
14Quoted in James Hardy, et al., “Piecing Together the Puzzle: North Korea Country Briefing,” in 
Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 August 2015, 2. 
15Brad Roberts, “Tailored Options to Deter North Korea and WMD Threats,” in The Korean Journal 
of Defense Analysis 28, no. 1 (March 2016), 27.  
16Paul K. Davis et. al, “Deterrence and Stability for the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis 28, No. 1 (March 2016), 1.  
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minute to turn to its nuclear arsenal in a conflict, making the onset of war due to nuclear 
weapons unlikely, although their use at some point does seem to be a likely scenario.  
Along with its controversial nuclear weapons program, North Korea is 
concurrently improving its missile program.17 Included in the North’s missile program is 
its SLBM, which could provide North Korea with its greatest threat to South Korea and 
her allies if it is able to work through the technical challenges. Gabriel Dominguez 
explains the North’s efforts in improving its missile program in his analysis:  
Photographs released by Pyongyang on 24 April suggest North Korea has 
a second SLBM that uses a solid propellant propulsion system and “cold 
launch” technologies, in addition to the liquid-fuel Pukgeukseong-1 
(Polaris-1) it has already revealed. Pyongyang’s achievements in solid 
rocket fuel motors for larger missiles and cold-launch technology makes 
its near-term development of a ballistic missile submarine capability more 
credible, thus increasing the threat level for neighboring South Korea.18 
In conjunction with its SLBM program, if North Korea is successful in miniaturizing a 
nuclear warhead to fit on the SLBM, North Korea might secure for itself a second-strike 
capability. An SLBM-capable KPN submarine would require constant monitoring if the 
South were to counter a ballistic missile attack from the North. The recent acquisition of 
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) by the ROKN may be an attempt to do just that: “South 
Korea’s decision to more than double its fleet of MPAs is the latest move to bolster its 
navy and in particular should see an improvement in its anti-submarine warfare 
capabilities, which were criticized in a March 2011 MoD report into the sinking of the 
corvette Chon An [sic] in March 2010 that was blamed on a North Korean submarine.”19 
Further hostilities between the two Koreas could result from maritime skirmishes. 
Jim Dorschner, along with others, highlights the significant maritime conventional threat 
posed by the KPN: “More dangerous is the sizeable KPN submarine fleet, which is kept 
                                                 
17Andrew Forbes and Yoon Sukjoon, “Old and New Threats from North Korea Against the Republic 
of Korea,” in Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and Challenges, ed. Geoffrey Till and Yoon Sukjoon 
(Seoul: Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, 2011), 30. 
18Gabriel Dominguez, “South Korea Developing SLMBs for KSS-III Attack Submarines,” Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 2 June 2016. 
19James Hardy, “South Korea Plans Expansion of MPA Fleet,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 3 June 2013. 
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at a higher state of readiness than other elements of the navy.”20 William Sullivan also 
describes the maritime concern: 
Here in Korea, the threat of a million-man army to the north and thousands 
of tubes of artillery arrayed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is what 
captures the most attention. But, it is important to remember that in the 
last dozen years, all of the most serious clashes with North Korea have 
taken place at sea—most recently in the tragic torpedo attack on the 
Republic of Korea Ship (ROKS) Cheonan.21  
Furthermore, Andrew Forbes and Yoon Sukjoon highlight the KPN submarine 
fleet’s limited but lethal capabilities, as well as its ability to adapt to ever-changing 
mission sets as ROKN vessels become technologically more advanced. Specifically, they 
point out the different types of missions that the KPN submarines have conducted 
ranging from SOF insertion, to fishing boat harassments, to torpedo attacks against the 
Cheonan.22 Up until the torpedo attack, KPN submarines were primarily used for SOF 
insertions because of their ability to clandestinely deliver a “platoon-sized” team 
onshore.23 In September of 1996, a KPN Sang-O class submarine grounded while 
attempting to pick up a three man infiltration team it had dropped off a couple of days 
prior. The crew decided to abandon the submarine in an attempt to make it back to the 
North via foot resulting in a manhunt that lasted over a month with 24 KPN fatalities, 16 
ROK fatalities, 27 ROK casualties, one KPN captured, and one KPN escaping.24 This 
incident presents the chaos just one KPN submarine is able to produce against the South. 
The KPN’s possession of 40 Yugo class and 20 Sang-O class submarines significantly 
challenge not just the ROKN submarine force, but the entire ROK armed forces as a 
whole. The KPN also demonstrated the extent of its submarine force’s operational reach 
                                                 
20Jim Dorschner, “Back from the Brink—Conflict Scenarios on the Korean Peninsula,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 16 May 2013, 4. 
21William D. Sullivan, “Old Issues and New Threats,” in Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and 
Challenges, ed. Geoffrey Till and Yoon Sukjoon (Seoul, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy: 2011), 5.  
22Andrew Forbes and Yoon Sukjoon, “Old and New Threats from North Korea Against the Republic 
of Korea,” in Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and Challenges, ed. Geoffrey Till and Yoon Sukjoon 
(Seoul, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy: 2011), 19–36. 
23Ibid., 24–25.  
24Ibid. 
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by infiltrating the ROK’s southernmost island of Jeju-do, expanding the ROKN’s search 
area.25 
All of the maritime clashes, especially in the West Sea, between the two sides 
indicate the volatility of the sea-based threats posed by North Korea; the Cheonan 
incident provides a sobering example of the threat posed by a technically inferior but 
well-trained North Korean submarine crew. The increasing trend in the violent 
provocations poses higher chances of unintended escalation leading to full-out conflict in 
the future. 
If the North Koreans did decide to make another attempt at unifying the peninsula 
or gaining additional territory, an eventual land battle is inevitable, but the odds of North 
Korea making such a bold initial move against the ROK and the United States seems 
unlikely. Authors like William Sullivan are not alone in describing the North’s inferiority 
against the South: “The North Korean navy is no match for conventional war at sea terms 
for the ROK Navy. For that reason, the most likely scenarios for naval warfare with 
North Korea will likely include many of the same tactics, techniques and procedures 
employed by non-state actors.”26 The asymmetric advantages that the North has over the 
South are what it may focus on to deliver a destructive initial blow to make up for its 
technological inferiority. This thesis aims at focusing on the threat posed by the North’s 
undersea forces and the South’s efforts to deter or combat that threat. A significant 
literature covering the land-centric focus of North and South Korea provides the 
foundation and history of the Korean Peninsula, but only a limited number of books and 
articles delve into laying out the threats, concerns, and potential ways ahead in combating 
the threats arising from the undersea domain. The goal of this thesis is not to predict that 
the next ensuing conflict on the Peninsula will commence from under the sea, but rather 
to delve into the possible threats ahead of time to hedge against surprise attacks from the 
undersea domain and to examine their potential role in larger conflicts.  
                                                 
25Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Submarine was on Mission to Spy on South,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
September 35, 1996. 
26William D. Sullivan, “Old Issues and New Threats,” in Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and 
Challenges, ed. Geoffrey Till and Yoon Sukjoon (Seoul, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy: 2011), 11.  
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The South Korean Navy has the responsibility of protecting the waters of the 
ROK. As mentioned before, the ROKN is significantly more modern and technologically 
advanced than the aging KPN. This advantage mostly makes up for the large discrepancy 
between the numbers of assets in the two navies. The ROKN submarine force of thirteen 
submarines is only five percent of the KPN’s submarine force.27 Even if all of the ROKN 
submarines were out at sea at the same time, they could not physically stop all of the 
KPN’s submarines from reaching their destinations in South Korea. This is a significant 
threat that the ROKN needs to counter, as evidenced by the KPN’s demonstration of 
getting over 50 percent of their submarine fleet under way in less than 24 hours. 
Additionally, the complex shallow water environment of the West Sea provides the 
perfect setting for a midget submarine trying to remain undetected by negating the 
advantages of the technologically advanced ROKN submarines and ships. The North 
Korean leadership understands the threats and challenges provided by its submarine fleet, 
making it likely to continue to rely on it for provocations and other clandestine 
objectives. If the frequency of North Korean submarine activity increases, that provides 
an increased chance of interaction with the ROKN. The more interactions there are 
between the two navies, the greater chance of escalation, leading to recommencement of 
the Korean war. The possible presence of nuclear weapons on the side of North Korean 
Navy only emboldens the KPN, complicating the undersea predicament facing Korean 
Peninsula security. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The best example of the types of threats posed by the undersea domain around the 
Korean Peninsula is the March 26, 2010, attack on the ROKS Cheonan. This incident 
clearly demonstrates the advantage and threat that even an inferior submarine with aging 
weapons can have against a technologically superior navy; therefore, a technically 
advanced submarine can bring certain advantages to the fight if it has the advantage of 
surprise. Due to the large number of KPN submarines, their ability to operate 
clandestinely, and their lethal threat capability, it is presumable that Kim Jung Un will 
                                                 
27Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Karl Dewey, “North Korea Modernises Submarine Fleet,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 9 February 2016.  
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continue to resort to the asymmetric advantage provided by the subsurface domain for 
future provocations. Additionally, the Cheonan incident created doubt in the South’s 
capability to properly defend against the North’s submarine threat. Andrew Forbes and 
Yoon Sukjoon not only question the ROKN’s ability but question the ability of ROK 
Armed Forces as a whole in defending against the North’s provocations.28 Joseph S. 
Bermudez Jr. and Karl Dewey explain in their article in Jane’s Intelligence Review that 
as a response to the sinking of the Cheonan “a number of South Korean government 
agencies have been tasked with the responsibility of developing weapons, systems, and 
platforms that can better protect the country against these underwater threats.”29 These 
reforms will have further implications on the security of the Peninsula. 
The ROK navy’s improvements in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities 
through training, acquisition of new platforms, and technological improvements will 
undoubtedly improve its ability to detect submerged contacts in the waters surrounding 
South Korea. Unfortunately, unless the subsurface threat is detected while it is surfaced, 
positive identification will remain a challenge. Assuming counter-detection of a known 
KPN submarine, the manner of prosecution by the ROKN will play a critical role in the 
outcome of the interaction. With the sinking of the Cheonan still fresh in the ROKN’s 
memory, an aggressive prosecution of the KPN submarine is not hard to imagine. One 
could imagine a scenario where an aggressive prosecution by the South ignites a series of 
interactions between the two navies that quickly escalates out of control, producing 
unintended consequences for the security of the peninsula. 
In order to counter the challenge posed by the KPN’s superiority in the number of 
submarines, the ROK navy could investigate use of high-tech unmanned underwater 
vehicles (UUV) in the East Sea. The UUVs could be used to provide locating data of the 
KPN submarines that could then be used by MPA to take them out. Unfortunately, due to 
poor acoustics in and other shallow water disadvantages in the West Sea, use of UUVs 
                                                 
28Andrew Forbes and Yoon Sukjoon, “Old and New Threats from North Korea Against the Republic 
of Korea,” in Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and Challenges, ed. Geoffrey Till and Yoon Sukjoon 
(Seoul, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy: 2011), 40. 
29Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Karl Dewey, “North Korea Modernises Submarine Fleet,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, 9 February 2016, 10. 
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would not provide similar advantages. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with night 
vision or infrared capabilities would be better suited to visually detect KPN submarines 
attempting to infiltrate the South. If the ROKN or ROKAF develops a squadron of 
unmanned vehicles to assist in searching for KPN assets, it can be one viable option in 
countering the KPN subsurface threat. Additionally, apart from ROKN’s internal ASW 
improvements, if the ROK Navy and the U.S. Navy cooperate and improve undersea 
detection and defense, security on the Korean Peninsula will be improved. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research will take a comparative case study approach of the two Korea’s 
undersea forces. Setting the likely outcome of conflicts between the two as the dependent 
variable, the research will focus on each country’s subsurface forces and their relative 
capabilities, their historical use of submarines, and the U.S. subsurface force’s possible 
contribution in affecting these outcomes. The comparative case studies provide the best 
method to examine the various ways conflict between the subsurface forces of the two 
countries may escalate into war. Considering the subsurface forces of the two sides 
provides a heuristic case study breaking from the common land-centric theme. Looking 
specifically at subsurface domain and its forces will focus attention to the different 
sources available to the KPN for disrupting the security on the Korean Peninsula and on 
the ROK for preserving it. 
Looking at past maritime provocations and the continued increase in violence of 
the provocations, in conjunction with the North’s advances in subsurface assets, this 
research will attempt to analyze how the North has used the undersea domain and how it 
may use it in the future. The research will draw upon U.S. and ROK defense journals and 
books to analyze how North and South Korea are exploiting the undersea domain with 
advances in technology or strategy to gain an advantage over their adversary. A special 
emphasis on the Cheonan incident will be used to determine its impact on the South 
Korean military and its defense strategy. This research will also look at current and future 
cooperation between the ROKN and the USN toward integrating their efforts and 
developing possible future dominance of the undersea domain during peacetime and in 
 13 
case of hostilities to aiding the fight to maintain allied control of Sea Lines of 
Communications (SLOC) around the Korean Peninsula. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis will start off with a description of the security challenges posed by the 
North on the Korean Peninsula. Following this introduction, two chapters will focus on 
North and South Korea. The North Korean chapter will discuss past KPN maritime 
provocations, order of battle, subsurface acquisition and industry capabilities, and its 
current and future maritime strategies. Similarly, the South Korean chapter will focus on 
the ROKN submarine force, order of battle, and acquisition and industry programs. The 
South Korean chapter will also discuss the military and political changes in the ROK 
navy and military as a result of the Cheonan incident. The next chapter will focus on the 
U.S. Navy and will discuss current and future cooperation with the ROKN to deter and 
combat KPN subsurface operations. Finally, the conclusion will highlight possible U.S.-
ROK countermeasures to the threats posed by the KPN subsurface forces. 
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II. THE NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE FLEET 
The North Korean People’s Navy (KPN) is not the first thing that comes to mind 
when thinking about this secluded country. With its million-man army pre-positioned 
along the DMZ, the immediate threat posed by the North’s land forces overshadow other 
dangers when thinking about security on the Korean Peninsula. Despite the land-centric 
focus on the peninsula, the KPN presents a formidable threat to the South. This chapter 
introduces the North Korean submarine force, starting off with a brief history of its 
origins and purpose. Then, it highlights the North’s reliance on the seas surrounding the 
Korean Peninsula for provocations against the South. The North’s inventory of 
submarines and their origins provide insight on the North’s ability to purchase, replicate, 
develop and deploy subsurface vessels to meets its requirements. Following the 
introduction of the North’s submarine inventory, the chapter will cover the two known 
examples of North Korean submarine infiltrations, as well as the sinking of the Cheonan, 
which serves to highlight the violence and dangers posed by the North’s subsurface 
forces. Finally, the chapter looks at the KPN’s current and future strategy in regard to its 
submarine force. 
1. Brief History 
The KPN has an inventory of approximately 750 vessels and 70 submarines, 
making it one of the biggest navies in the world.30 The submarines are stationed on the 
west and east coasts of the country with responsibilities for protecting both shores. They 
are further separated into submarines operated by the KPN and the Reconnaissance 
General Bureau (RGB). Jane’s World Navies provides that  
the KPN submarine fleet consists of approximately 20 Romeo-class diesel 
SSKs, and 30 smaller Sang-O and K-300-class [Sang-O II] SSCs. 
Meanwhile, the Reconnaissance General Bureau submarine fleet consists 
                                                 
30“Korea, North—Navy,” Jane’s World Navies, July 12, 2017, 
http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwna0082-jwna.  
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of approximately 10 Sang-O SSC, five Yono-class SSM, and five Yugo-
class SSMs, all of which serve an infiltration role.31  
The difference between the two commands is that the KPN is focused on conventional 
war time operations, whereas the RGB is more focused on peacetime operations. It is 
likely that following the onset of hostilities against the South, RGB submarines could join 
KPN forces upon completion of SOF infiltration duties. 
The KPN submarine force’s mission supports the overall goal of the North’s naval 
strategy. Ken Gause explains that the “wartime employment [of KPN submarines] is 
believed to include coastal defence, insertion of special operations forces, mining, and 
attack of merchant ships and unescorted troop transports off South Korean ports.”32 
Jane’s World Navies expands on these missions by stating that “KPN submarines may 
extend this by conducting short-range offensive patrols off both Japanese coasts; [and] 
long-range offensive patrols in the East China Sea, approaches to Japan, and the 
Philippine Sea.”33 The short- and long-range KPN submarine patrols present a threat to 
ROK and U.S. forces because they also expand the operating area of KPN submarines, 
requiring the ROKN and the USN to make decisions on dedicating ASW assets to protect 
allied shipping and forces during contingencies. Bigger operating areas mean bigger 
search areas, which then results in further assets being dedicated to the search or assets 
being pulled away for a longer period of time to cover the entire area. Another dilemma a 
bigger operating area creates for the South is whether to search for the missing submarine 
or accept the risk of operating a high-value unit (HVU) in an area that has not been 
sanitized of enemy submarines. In contingencies, U.S. leadership will face the same 
dilemma prior to sending in U.S. carrier strike groups into the Korean Theater of 
Operations (KTO). 
Peacetime operations of the KPN submarine force focus on provocations and 
clandestine operations in South Korean waters. Although the submarines in the RGB are 
                                                 
31“Korea, North—Navy,” Jane’s World Navies, July 12, 2017, 
http://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jwna0082-jwna.  
32Ken Gause, “North Korean Navy Grows in Influence,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 12, 2002. 
33“Korea, North—Navy,” Janes World Navies (July 12, 2017), 
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of the same class as those in the KPN, they are specifically designed to infiltrate and 
recover SOF personnel in the South. Once on land, SOF personnel gather intelligence for 
future operations, spread propaganda for recruitment, and provide targeting information 
for key South Korean organizations.34 These operations not only provide critical data for 
future conflicts, but also provide experience to both the KPN SOF and submarine forces. 
Along with the experience, another benefit of operating south of the NLL is that 
operations in South Korean waters provide the KPN with critical information about the 
maritime environment of potential battlegrounds. Understanding the operational 
environment is critical for preventing counter-detection, or vice versa, detecting the 
enemy, especially in shallow water environments like the West Sea. This is a significant 
advantage the KPN submarines enjoy over the ROKN because of operational limitations 
in South Korea preventing submarine operations north of the NLL.35 Additionally, the 
free flow of North Korean submarines across the NLL creates safety concerns as 
subsurface activities increase in the region. Although the ocean is big, undersea features 
create lanes favorable for submarine operations, increasing possible encounters or, even 
worse, collisions with other submarines. The high clutter environment near the littorals 
and shallow waters off the Korean Peninsula significantly degrades submarine detection, 
even for the technologically advanced ROKN submarines, further increasing the risk of 
collisions. William Sullivan captures the difficulties of submarine detection in shallow 
water environments: “ASW in particular is much more difficult in shallow water where 
high powered sonars are virtually blinded by the effects of shallow water and where 
passive ASW is virtually impossible.”36 KPN submarine operations below the NLL not 
only create a security threat to the ROK, but also create a safety concern as well. 
This does not mean the KPN submarines are immune to the same challenges. The 
shallow water environment limits deep operations that provide some safety from collision 
                                                 
34Andrew Forbes and Yoon Sukjoon, “Old and New Threats from North Korea Against the Republic 
of Korea,” in Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and Challenges, ed. Geoffrey Till and Yoon Sukjoon 
(Seoul, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy: 2011), 20. 
35Sukjoon Yoon, “Expanding the ROKN’s Capabilities to Deal with the SLBM Threat From North 
Korea,” Naval War College Review 70, no. 2 (2017), 63. 
36William D. Sullivan, “Old Issues and New Threats,” in Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and 
Challenges, ed. Geoffrey Till and Yoon Sukjoon (Seoul, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy: 2011), 8–9.  
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with the large number of fishing vessels. Additionally, the high noise clutter environment 
that hides the KPN submarines has the same effect against the ROKN ASW forces. The 
high density of fishing vessels also presents a challenge for the submerged submarine to 
navigate through. Because of the shallow nature of the West Sea, it is likely for the KPN 
submarine to operate at periscope depth (PD). Operations at PD present a challenge to 
submerged operations, due to limits on speed and maneuverability, as well physically 
positioning the submarine closer to ships, raising the potential for collisions. The slower 
operating speeds at PD hinder maneuverability, and the submarine’s ability to get out of 
the way of a merchant vessel steaming along at 10 to 12 knots is reduced. PD operations 
also place the submarine’s sensors in the same column of water as the rest of the noise in 
the ocean, limiting the sensors’ ability to pick out contacts that pose a counter-detection 
or collision threat to the boat. Finally, operating with masts sticking out of the water 
increases the submarine’s chances of being detected visually or by radar. Although many 
challenges exist in shallow-water submarine operations, the difficulties associated with 
finding a submarine provide an advantage to the infiltrators over those defending an area. 
From available open-source information, KPN Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
capability is extremely limited. The KPN surface ships that have any kind of sound 
navigation and ranging (SONAR) system are limited to two types (Stag Horn and Ear), 
which are high-frequency active SONARs.37 Due to the high-frequency nature of the 
SONARs, one can conclude that detection ranges would be low due to the attenuation 
losses experienced in salt water and the reverberation in shallow water. Additionally, the 
fact that the only SONAR systems equipped on the ships are of the active variety limits 
its ASW tactics to flooding the water with active pulses to find submarines. Although 
active SONAR can be effective in finding submarines, it gives away the ship’s position 
and lets the boats know that they have been detected or are suspected of being in the area. 
Again, the short ranges of the active pulses serve more as a signal to the ROKN 
submarines of KPN surface ship presence and provide targeting data, rather than 
providing asymmetric advantages for the KPN regarding the possible location of foreign 
submarines. 
                                                 
37“Democratic Republic of Korea,” 20178-18 Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2017, 469–75. 
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The number of classes of vessels and ships with ASW weapons indicate the level 
of importance placed on ASW by the KPN. KPN Guided Missile Frigates (FFGs) are the 
only ships that have torpedo tubes and SONAR systems as an integrated system.38 The 
Shenshen class ships have torpedo tubes but no SONAR, making the class an Anti-
Surface Warfare (ASuW) platform rather than for ASW. The same could be said about 
the Ku Song, Sin Hung, and Mod Sin Hung ships.39 Other patrol craft in the KPN 
inventory are equipped with depth charges, but again do not have any SONAR to aid in 
detection of submarines operating deep. The KPN’s exact ASW capabilities are difficult 
to determine without the North releasing information about them, but an initial review of 
its vessels and capabilities indicates a very limited number of devoted ASW vessels 
having relatively primitive means of detecting and engaging submarines. The North is 
either not concerned about the subsurface threat posed by the ROKN submarine force, or 
believes it cannot afford or obtain sophisticated ASW technologies. Along the same lines, 
this may be the weakness the ROKN needs to focus on, especially with its superiority in 
technologically advanced submarines. 
a. Maritime Provocations 
North Korea uses its submarine force to conduct maritime provocations against 
the South that range from intelligence collection via clandestine infiltration operations to 
overt sinking of ROKN ships.40 The number of previously undetected submarine 
infiltrations prior to the capture of the KPN submarines in the late 1990s is unknown, but 
it is certain that infiltrations happened. Andrew Forbes and Captain (Ret) Yoon Sukjoon 
supports the claim by providing that “in general, from the late 1950s to the 1970s, the 
KPN conducted spy mission-oriented infiltration operations using the seas surrounding 
the Korean peninsula.”41 The most recent example is the Kangnung incident in 1996. A 
                                                 
38Ibid. 
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40Yoon Sukjoon, “Some Current Issues in Korean Maritime Security and Maritime Strategy,” in 
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North Korean Sang-O class midget submarine grounded off the east coast of South 
Korea, near the city of Kangnung. The sailors onboard decided to make an attempt to 
return to the North by foot, resulting in a massive manhunt that disrupted the daily lives 
of the citizens in the region.42 Jane’s Defence Weekly explains that in response to the 26 
or so KPN forces,  
South Korean authorities immediately initiated standard counter-
infiltration procedures, placed army units on alert, rushed other troops and 
national police units to the Kangnung area. Blocking positions were 
established north of the city…search operations initiated…[with] 
additional security precautions taken nationwide, particularly in Seoul.43  
The submarine- delivered commandos foreshadow the likely level of chaos posed 
by North Korean special forces in a time of war. It is hard to imagine what kind of impact 
a full-scale invasion by North Korean special forces from submarines would have on the 
South militarily and socially. More importantly, this incident highlighted the difficulties 
of and the South’s weakness in guarding against KPN submarine operations. Regrettably, 
no real progress or movement to improve ASW was initiated until the sinking of the 
Cheonan, some ten years later.44 Fortunately, as described by Wendell Minnick, it 
appears the North has shifted away from infiltrations and opted to take an asymmetric 
approach with its submarine force because of its technological inferiority against the 
South.45 Not only was the approach of provocations altered, but the level of violence has 
increased as well. 
The deadliest recent provocation against the South in the maritime domain by a 
North Korean submarine took place in the West Sea. Leon Sigal explains that “on March 
26, 2016, North Korea sank a South Korean Navy corvette, the Cheonan, killing 46 
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people, the deadliest encounter in Korea in two decades.”46 Some question the 
involvement of the North Korean submarine in the sinking of the Cheonan, but a joint 
investigation conducted by civilian and military experts from the ROK, U.S., UK, 
Australia, Sweden, and Canada determined that “the evidence overwhelmingly points to 
the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean submarine.”47 Experts like 
Sigal believe that “North Korea carried out the attack [on the Cheonan] to avenge the 
destruction of one of its ships by South Korea last November.”48 Others argue that the 
North is shifting its focus to unconventional or asymmetric submarine operations to 
bridge the technological gap between the two navies.49 William Sullivan predicts that 
“the North Korean navy is no match in conventional war at sea terms for the ROK Navy. 
For that reason, the most likely scenario for naval warfare with North Korea will likely 
include many of the same tactics, techniques and procedures employed by non-state 
actors.”50 Regardless of the North’s intentions in attacking the Cheonan, it is evident that 
despite their technological inferiority, the KPN submarines continue to present a 
significant security threat to the ROKN. Furthermore, recent discovery of a new class of 
KPN submarine indicates a potential capability to launch ballistic missiles, further 
elevating the security situation around the Korean Peninsula. 
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and a new class of submarine by 
the KPN create a new type of maritime threat not seen before on the Korean Peninsula. 
Chosun Ilbo points out that “the last remaining threat the North had up its sleeve was an 
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SLBM, and now it has become a reality.”51 Although still in its infancy, a mature SLBM 
program could provide Kim with a second-strike nuclear capability. The Chosun Ilbo 
goes on to explain why a North Korean SLBM is so dangerous:  
An SLBM poses an entirely new level of threat. North Korean submarines 
can sneak into South Korea waters and fire a missile that would render 
existing defenses useless. The U.S. and Japan now fall under the threat of 
North Korean SLBMs, which could trigger major changes to the security 
environment here.52  
They further add that “SLBM attacks would be difficult to detect unless a country’s own 
submarine lie in wait in front of an enemy’s submarine base and ambush them in 
crisis.”53 This may be the reason why former ROKN submarine officers are concerned 
with the North’s investment in this new capability.54 Gabriel Dominguez explains the 
North’s efforts in improving its missile program in his analysis: 
Photographs released by Pyongyang on 24 April suggest North Korea has 
a second SLBM that uses a solid propellant propulsion system and ‘cold 
launch’ technologies, in addition to the liquid-fuel Pukgeukseong-1 
(Polaris-1) it has already revealed. Pyongyang’s achievements in solid 
rocket fuel motors for larger missiles and cold-launch technology makes 
its near-term development of a ballistic missile submarine capability more 
credible, thus increasing the threat level for neighboring South Korea.55 
An SLBM-capable KPN submarine would require constant monitoring if the 
South were to counter a ballistic missile attack from the North. The best way to prevent 
the missile from being fired is to take out the submarine carrying the missile before it 
shoots it. That means the location of the submarine needs to be known at all times, which 
is why the non-nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSB) requires monitoring. Once a 
submarine reaches the high seas, it gets significantly more difficult to detect and requires 
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a lot of dedicated assets to find it, even if the submarine is an old KPN diesel submarine. 
Following a submarine out of homeport and tracking it makes the process much more 
efficient. Unfortunately for the ROK, it is prohibited from making preemptive attacks and 
has to rely on methods of shooting down the missile once it is in the air. As mentioned 
earlier, current ROK policy makes the SLBM problem a reactive one rather than a 
proactive one.56 The South has realized this limitation and is considering options to 
eliminate such restrictions. 
Other maritime provocations in the late 1990s and early 2000s, not involving 
submarines, by the KPN emphasize the violence and the capability imbalance between 
the two navies. They also support Ken Gause’s statement on Kim Jong-il’s proclivity to 
make use of the surrounding seas to his advantage: “Since the beginning of the Kim 
Jong-il era, North Korea has used the seas around the Korean Peninsula to threaten and 
signal its neighbors to the South…. The area around the North Limit Line (NLL) 
provides Pyongyang with a uniquely suited venue to carry out its strategy of 
brinkmanship.”57 Naval skirmishes near the NLL of the West Sea in 1999 and 2002 
represented this brinkmanship strategy, the violent nature of maritime provocations, and 
the threat to the security of the Korean Peninsula posed by the KPN.58 The threat posed 
by the KPN submarine force continues to prove difficult for the ROKN to get a good 
handle on. 
b. Order of Battle 
North Korea builds all of its own submarines today, but that was not always the 
case. Before building its own submarines, North Korea purchased its submarines from 
                                                 
56Sukjoon Yoon, “Expanding the ROKN’s Capabilities to Deal with the SLBM Threat from North 
Korea,” Naval War College Review 70, no. 2 (2017), 63. 
57Ken E. Gause, “North Korean Calculus in the Maritime Environment: Covert versus Overt 
Provocations,” in The Changing Security Environment and Continuing North Korean Military Threat, 
KIMS, (Seoul, Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy:2013), 187. 
58Yoon Sukjoon, “Some Current Issues in Korean Maritime Security and Maritime Strategy,” in 
Korean Maritime Strategy: Issues and Challenges, ed. Geoffrey Till and Yoon Sukjoon (Seoul, Korea 
Institute for Maritime Strategy: 2011), 158. 
 24 
China, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.59 The submarines purchased from other 
countries include the Whiskey-class, Romeo-class, and Yugo-class submarines, in that 
order.60 Jane’s World Navies explains that “the nominal vessels of the DPRK represent a 
mixture of former Chinese, North Korean, and Soviet construction.”61 The KPN made 
improvements to the original models, but the technology embedded in the submarines is 
not too far advanced from when they were acquired in the 1960s and ‘70s. The KPN 
Sang-O captured in 1996 revealed modifications using commercial equipment. Despite 
the fact that the submarines are old and have limited technology onboard, Youn Young-
sik points out that the North Korean-built submarines “can carry out their missions 
around the entire Korean peninsula and well out into the China Sea and the Sea of 
Japan.”62 Furthermore, it is believed that the submarine force is at the highest state of 
readiness within the KPN organization, threatening the security of not just Korea, but the 
rest of the region as well.63 In August of 2015, the KPN displayed the extent of the 
submarine force’s readiness with “the emergency ‘flushing’ bringing approximately 70 
percent of the KPN’s submarines to patrol stations in the East Sea and West Sea. This 
was the largest ever deployment of KPN submarines,” explains Jane’s.64 This flushing 
defies the common belief that the North’s forces are dilapidated and undisciplined due to 
the North’s economic struggles. Unfortunately, the opposite is true and, as discussed 
above, the sinking of the South Korean corvette in March of 2016 displayed the perfect 
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example of the violent threat the KPN submarine force continues to pose against the 
South.65 
The heart of the KPN submarine force is made up of the indigenously built Sang-
O class submarines. Jane’s World Navies explains that  
the Sang-O class SSC remains the primary submarine within the KPN. 
There are at least two variants of the original class, one being for 
specialised reconnaissance/infiltration and the second with a hull of 
slightly greater length as the lead vessel but with a significantly wider 
beam reportedly designed as a specialised SOF delivery boat.66  
The Sang-O submarines were later updated in the 2000s leading with the Sang-O II, also 
known as the K-300 SSC.67 Joseph Cohen explains that “production estimates run 
between two to five or six vessels built to date. It is expected the K-300 will replace the 
entire ROMEO boats. In terms of armaments, the K-300 closely resembles the original 
‘Sang-O’ class, perhaps indicating this boat will serve as an eventual replacement for the 
aging ‘Sang-O’ hulls.”68 Along with the Sang-O class, the Yugo-class submarines 
continue to support KPN submarine missions. The Yugo’s were bought from Yugoslavia 
in the 1980s probably because if their smaller size, making them ideal for the shallow 
water environment around the Korean Peninsula. The submarine’s ability to operate 
closer to shore provides advantages over bigger submarines, which are limited to deeper 
waters, allowing it to access areas that were not feasible before. The main advantage is 
that the shallow water environment significantly complicates the sound propagation path, 
masking its presence against the South’s technologically advanced SONAR systems. 
Along with the complicated path is the attenuation of sound in the shallow water 
environment, as well as the mixing of the sound with background noise that further 
complicates detection of KPN submarines. All of the mentioned factors have a net 
quieting effect for the submarine, making it extremely difficult to detect aurally. The 
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smaller size also makes it physically harder to see from a plane or radar. The midget 
submarines are ideal for insertion of SOF and other clandestine operations, but they are 
not suited for longer-term deployments or attacking shipping and allied troop escorts in 
the open ocean. 
To accomplish the other leg of the KPN submarine mission, the Kim regime 
purchased Romeo-class submarines from the Chinese in the early 1970s.69 Joshua Cohen 
explains the advantages of the Romeos over the smaller KPN submarines: “Nearing 
obsolescence, the ROMEO armament and endurance exceeds [sic] smaller ‘Sang-O’ and 
‘Yugo’ class boats, making the type a better fit for operations in the vast Sea of Japan.”70 
These 1,800-ton submarines present the biggest threat to ROKN destroyers, as well as to 
USN ships as they arrive into the Korean theater in a time of war, because of their ability 
to operate in deeper waters away from the coast where the majority of the KPN 
submarines are expected to operate. Although they are predicted to be decommissioning 
the Romeos and potentially replacing them with the Sang-O II’s, recent observation of 
Romeo operations in the East Sea indicate their enduring threat to the South despite their 
age and low level of technology.71 
The four major classes of KPN submarines and their numbers in the KPN support 
the North’s offensive strategy of surprising the South with an overwhelming number of 
vessels at the onset of hostilities.72 Certainly inferior in technology against the South, the 
Office of Naval Intelligence analysis explains the North’s reasoning for maintaining such 
a large number of submarines by saying that 
North Korea lacks a sufficiently sophisticated technology base to field 
more advanced systems and so has chosen quantity over quality in its 
submarine force…Nevertheless, North Korea’s strategy emphasizes 
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employment of large numbers of low technology submarines and… 
saturate the defender’s ASW forces.73  
Youn Young-sik goes further to state that “although they are obsolescent by world 
standards, and particularly limited by noise and range, these range limitations, however, 
are no constraint in operations against the South, and in shallow water even noisy 
submarines would strain the South’s ASW forces.”74 Unfortunately, recent discovery of a 
new class of submarine and North Korea’s advancements in missile technology present a 
new subsurface threat. 
North Korea continues to raise the stakes on threats against the security of the 
Korean Peninsula with the creation of a new class of submarine. In 2014, satellite 
imagery captured what is now believed to be an experimental ballistic missile submarine 
named Sinp’o or Gorae.75 A KPN ballistic missile submarine significantly raises the 
North’s ability to deliver a bigger payload or a second strike because of the difficulties of 
finding a submarine in the open ocean. An SLBM-capable KPN submarine would raise 
the demand for constant monitoring if the South were to counter a ballistic missile attack 
from the North. Again, a KPN submarine with a nuclear-tipped SLBM raises the threat in 
the region, moving the North closer to its goal of joining a handful of nuclear-armed 
states in the world with such capabilities. Joseph Bermudez explains the advantages of an 
SSB: “A core component of nuclear deterrence theory is having the ability to guarantee a 
nuclear response, regardless of the extent of the attack suffered. Ensuring this retaliatory, 
or ‘second-strike’ capability reinforces the credibility of a nuclear-armed state, as without 
this capability nuclear-armed adversaries may be tempted to launch a first strike.”76 At 
the same time Bermudez points out that although North Korea may have a second-strike 
capability, he believes that the technological inferiority of the KPN submarine fleet it 
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provides a lower quality deterrent compared to other countries.77 The Sinp’o/Gorae-class 
submarine’s ability to deliver conventional or nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles may be in 
question now, but if the North is able to work through those challenges it will behoove 
the ROKN and the region to determine a method to hedge against it rather than trying to 
convince North Korea to give up this effort, which is likely to be futile. If China’s 
difficulties in perfecting its SLBM program provides a sample timeline, it will likely 
require at least several years before the North secures this capability. But given Kim’s 
relentless pursuit of becoming a nuclear-armed state coupled with his Byungjin policy, 
dual-track improvement in the North’s economy and military, though, it is reasonable to 
assume that the SSB program will continue until at least some operational capability is 
achieved. In response to the North, the ROK government is pursuing an option of 
creating its own Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) to defend against the North’s 
missiles, as well as buying platforms from the United States to combat against the 
North’s provocations.78 As reported by Jane’s World Navies, North Korea is continuing 
its march towards obtaining the capability to launch an SLBM from the depths of the 
deep sea.79 Yoon explains that the threat of an SSB not only impacts South Korea, but 
has secondary effects in the region, elevating the security threat once more:  
The prospect of a North Korean deployment of Sinp’o/Gorae-class SSB in 
the East Sea drawing more attention from the ASW forces of the ROKN, 
the U.S. Navy, and JMSDF is most unwelcome to the Chinese military, 
especially if such scrutiny extends into the West Sea—a very sensitive 
area for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy, which bases its 
North Sea Fleet at Qingdao.80 
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Table 1.   KPN submarine procurement and development.81 
Category Class and Type Tonnage & 
Building Year 
Note 
1st Phase Whiskey class 
submarine 
1350 ton, 1960 Purchased from the 
Soviet Union 
2nd Phase Romeo class 
submarine 
1800 ton, 1973 Purchased from 
China and built 
locally 
3rd Phase Yugo class 
submarine 
110 ton, 1987 Purchased from 
Yugoslavia and 
built locally 
4th Phase Sang-O class 
submarine 
300 ton, 1995 Built by modifying 
the Yugo class 




Used for special 
operations 
 
2. DPRK Infiltration into and Attacks on the ROK 
KPN submarines provide North Korea with an opportunity to engage the South 
with surprise and stealth. Because South Korea is essentially an island isolated by land 
from any of its neighbor besides North Korea, the only way to reach the South is via the 
seas. Surrounded by water on three sides with shallow features in the west and south, the 
environment provides the North with an ideal setting for exploiting the undersea domain. 
The shallow water enables clandestine operations south of the NLL for the vast inventory 
of the KPN’s submarine force. As mentioned previously, it is hard to tell how many 
infiltration missions have been conducted in the past, but previously encountered events 
confirm that infiltrations happen. Surprisingly, the KPN demonstrated the extent of its 
submarine force’s operational reach by infiltrating the ROK’s southernmost island of 
Jeju-do, expanding the ROKN’s search area.82 This is significant because to reach Jeju-
do, the midget submarines had to get past every layer of the ROKN defenses from the 
NLL on down. Assuming the ultimate goal of the submarines is to make it back home, it 
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is highly likely that they did not operate too far off the coast due to their small size. This 
then would also indicate that whatever coastal detection and defenses the ROK has in 
place failed. It is hard to determine the goal of each infiltration, but each attempt carries 
with it significant potential for chaos in the South. 
SOF insertion from submarines into the South has grave effects on its society, but 
it also points to the South’s weaknesses in combating the submarine threat from the 
North. Forbes and Yoon highlights the North’s practicability to continue resorting to its 
submarine fleet to apply pressure on the South: “While only two examples of major 
infiltration incidents are outlined above, there have been numerous instances over the 
years, as it is the simplest and easiest activity for the North to provoke the South.”83 
Although the South has realized the weakness in its ASW capabilities and taken steps to 
address the problem, the long coastline, complexity of the environment, and number of 
interfering contacts provide stealth and advantage for the North Korean submarines. 
Within this setting, it makes sense for the North to continue to execute provocations 
against the South to delegitimize the ROKN’s ability to combat the submarine threat. As 
stated by ONI, “the ability of a small, slow-moving diesel submarine to operate 
undetected in the shallows along the coast was demonstrated by a North Korean SANGO 
(shark) coastal submarine (SSC) in September 1996.”84 The report goes on to describe 
the SANGO’s ability to freely enter and leave South Korean territorial waters over a 
period of three days.85 The fact that the submarine was able to operate undetected for that 
long is a strong indication of the weakness in the ROKN’s indications and warning of its 
ASW domain. Again, because of the ROKN’s ASW weakness, according to Forbes and 
Yoon, “infiltration is predominantly by submarine, midget submarines and specialist 
vessels, usually via the West Sea, but also more recently the East Sea. Submarine 
insertion is the preferred method because of its obviously covert nature and the ability of 
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the KPN to insert around platoon-sized forces.”86 Major Harry Dies describes the level of 
impact a single KPN submarine can have on the South: “The North Koreans, numbering 
26, abandoned their stranded submarine and rushed from the beach into the surrounding 
hills. What followed was a two-month bloody manhunt for the infiltrators that left all but 
two of the North Koreans dead. During the manhunt, 16 South Korean soldiers and 
civilians died and 27 were wounded.”87 Prior to the grounding, the submarine left and re-
entered South Korean waters without detection.88 Why did the infiltrators decide to land 
in Kangnung, which is just less than 100 miles from the DMZ? Did the North Korean’s 
have intelligence that this area was less closely guarded by the South because of its 
proximity to the DMZ? The concerning part from the ROKN perspective is that the 
submarine did not sit and wait, but traveled in and out of its waters multiple times 
without counter-detection. Indeed, the initial spotting of the submarine was by a taxi 
driver.89 As a result of the infiltration, the ROK military mobilized thousands of its 
soldiers and equipment in search of the infiltrators.90 The infiltration in 1996 highlights 
the danger and threats posed by the North Korean special forces, but more important for 
the ROKN submarine force to take away is that, unlike its submarines, KPN submarines 
conduct operations on the other side of the NLL. Operations in waters that will one day 
become the battleground between the two countries provide a huge advantage for the 
North. Another major takeaway from this incident is the difficulty of defending the long 
coastline against the KPN submarine force. 
North Korea delivered another blow to the ROKN when a second submarine was 
captured off the South’s east coast on June 22, 1998, just two years from the incident in 
Kangnung. Jane’s Defence Weekly explains that “this latest incident comes less than two 
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years after a North Korean Sang-O class submarine ran aground in the same area.”91 As 
with the infiltration attempt in 1996, it was not the ROK military but a local fisherman 
that initially detected the submarine as it was trying to get lose from a fishing net.92 This 
time, ROKN vessels were on the scene within an hour, but this event once again pointed 
out the ROKN’s struggles to combat the KPN submarine threat. Not everything was 
negative about the capture of the Yugo-class submarine, however. The capture of a 
different class of submarine provided an insight into the KPN submarine program as 
described by Jane’s: “Although variants of the Yugo class have been in production at the 
Yukdaeso-ri shipyard since the early 1960s, this latest seizure provides the South Korean 
and U.S. technical intelligence specialists with a rare opportunity to examine an in-
service boat at first hand.”93 This is especially important due to the lack of information 
flowing out of North Korea. Unfortunately for the ROKN, North Korea’s undersea efforts 
did not stop with the Yugo. This time, the KPN made it to the southern part of the 
peninsula, once again making it past the ROKN defenses and delivering another black 
eye to the organization. As described by Forbes and Yoon: “On 17 December 1998, a 
KPN semi-submersible high speed vessel was discovered a mile off the coast of Yeosu 
and a dozen ROKN ships were sent to intercept it.”94 The North’s continued efforts to 
exploit the advantages of the subsurface domain increase the possibility of uncalculated 
engagements, which also carry with them the potential for another rendition of the West 
Sea battles or, worse, escalation into something bigger that neither side desires. 
3. Acquisition and industry 
North Korea’s submarine force found its beginnings through foreign technology 
that eventually transferred into indigenous capability to create a force big enough to 
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include it in the rankings as one of the top five largest submarine forces in the world.95 
The KPN has not only built submarines for its own use, but is now a supplier of 
submarines to countries like Iran, Myanmar, and Vietnam.96 And as previously 
mentioned, the KPN is continuously making improvements to its inventory of submarines 
to fulfill its missions against the South. 
The KPN purchased submarines from their fellow communist countries to 
establish their submarine force. North Korea purchased its first Romeo-class submarine 
from the Chinese. Quickly after obtaining the submarines, North Korea starting building 
its own. Joshua Cohen explains the role the Romeos purchased from China played for the 
KPN submarine force: “Serving as prototypes for Pyongyang’s domestic production line, 
between 1976 and 1995 an estimated 17 Romeo [boats] were produced.”97 Jane’s 
supports KPN’s intentions of building a fleet of Romeo-class submarines: “This confirms 
the recent, annual construction of two to three units of the Chinese-Version (Type 033) of 
the ‘Romeo’ class patrol submarines. The submarine building programme is expected to 
continue, possibly peaking at about 30 boats. The KPN also retains the four ex-Russian 
‘Whiskey’ class submarines.”98 The Whiskey and Romeo submarines were some of the 
first submarine purchases by the KPN. Although the KPN inventory included more than 
20 Whiskey and Romeo submarines, it later stopped building the outdated Romeos and 
resorted to the Sang-O class submarines as the heart of its submarine force.99 The North’s 
shipbuilding industry gained critical experience from building the Romeos which, later 
enabled production of the follow-on submarines of its force.100 
Although the KPN operated submarines for almost 30 years, the trend towards 
smaller submarines began with the purchase of the Yugo-class submarines from 
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Yugoslavia in 1987.101 This was some thirty years after the North’s purchase of the 
Whiskey.102 Only a couple of year after the purchase of the Yugo, the North Korea 
introduced a class of submarines that would end up making up the core of its submarine 
force as described by Cohen: “In the early 1990s the 370 tons ‘Sang-O’ class was 
introduced. When production ended in 2003, approximately 38–40 boats were built.”103 
Cohen further explains the North’s commitment to its submarine force as it got creative 
to continue production of its midget submarines: 
In 1994, Pyongyang negotiated the sale of a reported 40 former Soviet 
GOLF and ROMEO submarines. Officially purchased for scrap metal, it is 
widely held components such as periscopes and torpedo tubes, among 
other were removed and fitted to several ‘Sang-O’ and ‘Yugo’ class mini-
submarines built as hunter-killers rather than with lockout chambers for 
clandestine insertion. Several sources cite satellite imagery of ROMEO 
boats in dry-dock being dismantled as evidence the class is being 
cannibalized.104 
This also supports the claim of Sang-O submarines replacing the Romeos in the 
KPN inventory. That was not the end of the North’s creativity. The North introduced two 
more classes of midget submarines in the mid- and late 1990s, the Yono and P-4, for 
inclusion into its force.105 The North’s relentless pursuit of a fleet of midget submarines 
shows the incredible capability of its submarine-building program, as well as its 
commitment and reliance on the platforms to execute its peacetime and wartime maritime 
operations. 
North Korea, however, is not finished making subsurface platforms. Jane’s 
explains that the source of the North’s innovations in its undersea domain is located in 
Pyongyang: “The factory in Pyongyang is known to modify and manufacture specialised 
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military equipment such as midget submarines, very slender vessels (VSV), and 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).”106 
It is likely that improvements in technology and cheap cost of unmanned 
underwater vehicles provide another threat to the security on the Korean Peninsula will 
also be products of this factory. Not much is known with respect to the North’s 
unmanned undersea capabilities yet, but it is rational to believe that they have a program 
looking to exploit the capability for their benefit and that it is only a matter of time before 
it is revealed. The North has used UAVs in the past to collect intelligence in the South. 
The advantages of stealth and freedom of maneuver provided by the subsurface domain 
may lead to a KPN UUV program that also needs to be addressed in the near future. 
4. Current and Future Strategy 
With its third leader at the helm, it is unclear if North Korea’s ultimate goal of 
unifying Korea under its control continues to drive its military modernization. The 
economic gap between the two countries is so vast that it is hard for one to imagine a 
Korea controlled by the North. Nonetheless, the two countries remain at war and, 
therefore, it is plausible to expect the North to continue provocation against the South via 
the subsurface domain, pursue a second-strike capability with its SLBM program, and 
look to technology to come up with innovative ideas to further exploit the subsurface 
domain. 
Provocations against the South via submarine infiltrations will continue for both 
wartime and peacetime operations. This is because the subsurface domain presents 
advantages for the capital-limited regime to exploit with its current fleet of submarines 
and deliver chaos without major improvements. The stealth provided by the subsurface 
domain enables the oldest and smallest of submarines to sneak into enemy waters and 
sink a ship with one torpedo, or it can send a squad or platoon of its SOF into the South 
creating havoc in major cities. Previous examples against the South only involved one 
submarine. One can only imagine what the North’s fleet of 70 submarines could 
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accomplish if it were fully deployed. Furthermore, the best way for North Korea to get its 
soldiers into the country is via a submarine. South Korea has proven that they do not have 
a system or assets that can detect a KPN submarine in its waters. They are taking strides 
to address the weakness in ASW, but that initiative did not take root until 2010. Joshua 
Cohen explains that “the ultimate goal is always to penetrate as far into the south 
possible, increasing chances of an undetected insertion mission. In late 1998, for 
example, a North Korean semi-submersible was intercepted only 2km off the coast of 
Yeosu in the Southern Jeolla Province.”107 The deep penetration into South Korean 
waters proves to the North Korean leadership that its subsurface forces remain its number 
one source of provocation against the South, able to meet its mission of inserting SOF 
deep into the South to create a second front, drawing forces away from the DMZ, and 
disrupting enemy shipping and troop escorts in war time scenarios. Cohen cites a recent 
study conducted by the U.S. Army Institute for Strategic studies that suggests that the 
KPN submarine force would present a challenge and survive longer than expected.108 
That prediction is probably based on the advantage the KPN has in numbers, which 
suggests that the North will continue to maintain its current inventory of submarines, if 
not increase it to secure that lead over the South. 
From the North’s perspective, there is no need to alter its submarine operations 
against the South. Throughout the years of operating its submarine force, the ROKN or 
the ROK military was not the reason for the capture of the two KPN submarines, rather, it 
was bad luck and lack of knowledge of the subsurface domain in the South. Bad luck is 
something that cannot be controlled, the latter can be fixed through purchase of updated 
charts of the South or clandestine surveys of the coasts that present favorable conditions 
for SOF infiltration. The reasons just mentioned supports ONI’s statement that  
in wartime, North Korean submarines are expected to take full advantage 
of environmental conditions that exists off of South Korea…Heavy fishing 
and merchant traffic is present along the coast and will provide a cluttered 
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environment generating high background noise levels that will help to hide 
a patrolling submarine’s acoustic signature.109  
The advantage provided by the natural environment plays a significant role in preventing 
early detection of the KPN submarines by ROK forces. It also negates the technological 
advances of the ROKN for counter-detection of the enemy.  
The advent of SLBM and SSBs throws a twist in the existing defense structure of 
the South against the North. The new capability—once fully operational--will allow the 
North to use the subsurface domain to position its submarine anywhere around South 
Korea, probably the West coast of Japan, or even in the Yellow Sea against China, 
presenting a significant threat to all the countries in the region. Taking it one step further, 
once the North achieves the ability to load the SSB with a nuclear-tipped SLBM, North 
Korea will secure itself a legitimate second- strike capability, potentially deterring the use 
of nuclear weapons against it. Current ROKN capabilities may fall short of constant 
surveillance of the SSBs without U.S. involvement. From the North’s perspective, it 
makes sense to hold onto its nuclear, missile, and SSB program, even in the face of strict 
sanctions against it. 
Finally, as closed off as North Korea is to the rest of the world, innovations in 
technology make its way into the hermit kingdom. The advent of unmanned vehicles in 
the air and subsurface domain could provide a significant advantage at a relatively low 
cost. The North has already shown its ability to exploit those advantages via the UAVs 
with cameras mounted on them spying on the South. It is reasonable to assume that the 
North is also pursuing unmanned vehicles to exploit the subsurface domain as well. For 
example, one area where UUVs can play a significant role is in collecting environmental 
and sounding data against the South. Their small features make them extremely difficult 
to detect as well as allowing them to get extremely close to shore. Both capabilities 
enable it to obtain data close to shore that can prevent future KPN submarine infiltrations 
from going wrong. 
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III. SOUTH KOREAN SUBMARINE FLEET 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) bears the challenging responsibility of 
protecting its coasts. Surrounded by water on three sides, the ROK divides its maritime 
boundaries into three different fleets. Each fleet commander is responsible for everything 
that happens in the maritime domain of his area of responsibility. The vast expanse of the 
oceans, especially the dark and challenging undersea domain, presents the South with 
challenges of defending its coasts from the North’s large inventory of outdated but 
dangerous submarines. Although historic figures like Admiral Yi Sun-shin realized the 
importance of the maritime domain in protecting the country in 1597, it was not until 
1945 that the South Korean government recognized it.110 Even then, significant 
modernization of its navy did not start until 1974.111 The initial purpose of the South’s 
navy was to protect its waters from the KPN, but it was the ROK’s realization of its 
dependence on the seas to fuel its economy that drove modernization of its navy. The 
newfound importance of the seas, however, continues to challenge the ROKN leadership 
as it competes with the army for funding and resources. Despite the inter-service 
competition, the ROKN managed to establish itself amongst other navies, not just in the 
region, but around the world as a technologically advanced and capable force. This 
chapter introduces and provides the ROKN’s history from the late 1940s to today, 
provides more specific details of the origins of the ROKN submarine force, its order of 
battle, and its acquisition and industry. Finally, it will analyze the evolution of ROKN 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) tactics and strategy before and after the Cheonan 
incident.  
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B. ROKN  
The ROKN emerged from humble beginnings. Its origins were so modest that it 
did not possess a single warship at the time of its creation.112 After Korea’s independence 
from Japan in 1945, it started off as a Maritime Affairs Association, which quickly 
transformed into the Maritime Defense Corps on November 11, 1945.113 This is the date 
that is recognized by the ROKN today as its birthday, but the official announcement of 
the ROKN did not come about until a few years later.114 It was under the name of the 
Maritime Defense Corps that the first ROK built ship, a 300 ton patrol craft, entered 
service on February 7, 1947.115 The Korean Coast Guard was established on June 1, 
1946, but lacked any of the necessary skills to navigate the waters off its coast.116 
Commander Cho Young-Joo of the ROKN demonstrates the Korean Coast Guard’s 
maritime competency by explaining that “although the advisory group [composed of 
members from the U.S. Coast Guard] had arranged for two LCIs [landing craft] to be 
transferred…it was not able to operate them and could not move them from Pusan to 
Jinhae by itself.”117 With the help of the advisory group, the Korean Coast Guard 
improved its competency to the point of acquiring the mission of patrolling its waters 
from the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet.118 The advisory group also played a critical role in 
acquiring a total of 36 ships from the American military, creating the foundation of the 
ROKN.119 Finally, the Korean Coast Guard was officially renamed the ROKN, still under 
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the leadership of Admiral Son Won-Il, on September 5, 1948, with the establishment of 
the ROK government.120  
Three years after establishment of the Maritime Defense Corps, the ROK still 
lacked a respectable warship. Due to funding shortages, Admiral Son raised enough 
money “to purchase only one PC [patrol craft] of 450-tons full load (PC-701) equipped 
with a 3-inch gun for $60,000 [from the U.S. Department of State]…[and] three similar 
PCs from a civilian sales company for $36,000,” explains Cho.121 In three short years 
Admiral Son was able to raise a navy of over 30 ships, just before the start of the Korean 
war.122 Although limited in capability to fend off the KPN, the ROKN contributed to the 
Korean War by partaking in coastal patrol missions, sea defense, evacuations, blockades, 
gunfire support missions, independent amphibious landings, mine warfare, and national 
coastal fishing grounds defense.123 During the Korean War, the ROKN played a critical 
role by stopping a KPN ship carrying troops heading to capture Pusan, which later 
became a critical United Nations staging ground for the war.124 
Following the Korean War, things changed rapidly for the ROKN as the South 
Korean economy really picked up steam during the second half of the 20th century. As 
Jane’s Navy International says about the ROKN, “it has transitioned from a coastal 
defence force to one of five navies worldwide that fields surface combatants equipped 
with the Aegis combat system.”125 This is a significant achievement considering the 
ROKN’s beginnings. Even with the incredible leap in capabilities and technology, the 
threat from North Korean People’s Navy (KPN) remains serious and presents many 
challenges. The ROKN made significant improvements to its inventory of war craft to 
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combat North Korea’s maritime threats. One of the major programs it undertook was in 
creating a formidable submarine force. 
1. ROKN Submarine Force 
The ROKN boasts a fleet of technologically advanced submarines with 
capabilities to challenge many nations around the world. The ROKN operates nine 
Jangbogo-I class (Type 209), nine Son Won-Il-class (Type 214) submarines. However, 
like its parent organization, the ROKN submarine force emerged from humble 
beginnings. Almost 30 years after commissioning its first vessel, in 1974, the ROKN was 
looking to modernize its navy to better defend against the KPN. Jane’s provides an 
explanation of the origins of the ROKN’s modernization program:  
Initially known as the Yulgok programme, the modernization push began 
in 1974 has more recently become known as the Force Improvement 
Programme (FIP)…The main elements of this modernization phase 
include the locally developed KDX destroyer, the Chang Bogo class [Type 
209] diesel electric patrol submarine built under license from Germany 
and the U.S.-made P-3C Update II maritime patrol aircraft (MPA).126 
The FIP initiated the first submarine purchase from Italy in 1974.127 Unlike today’s 
ROKN submarines, the one Cosmos-class submarine, which was equipped with anti-
surface weapons, was purchased to conduct clandestine insertions into North Korea.128 
With this purchase, due to the South’s lack of experience with submarines, Italy also 
provided instructors for operations and maintenance.129 Following almost ten years of 
midget submarine operations, in 1985 the ROKN produced its first indigenous boat 
named the Dologorae (SS 051).130 The two classes of midget submarines served to 
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conduct infiltrations and coastal operations, respectively.131 But these submarines were 
not capable of extended open ocean operations to defend against KPN surface or 
subsurface vessels. Conversely, by this point, the KPN submarine force had 
approximately 30 years of submarine operations. This included Romeo operations, which 
supported long-range, open-ocean missions. The North also built its own submarines, 
supplementing its force of purchased vessels.132 Thus, the ROKN was significantly 
behind the North with respect to dominating the subsurface domain around the Korean 
Peninsula up to the 1980s and well into the 1990s. 
As late as 1992, the ROKN did not have a submarine capable of countering the 
KPN subsurface threat.133 Although the KPN submarine force started with its first 
purchase of one submarine in the 1960s,134 the ROKN did not acquire its first attack 
submarine until the early 1990s.135 Additionally, due to the lack of expertise and the high 
cost of designing and creating its own submarine at the time, the ROKN decided to 
purchase its first submarine, the Type 209, from the Germans.136 As explained by 
Zachary Keck, “the purchase of Type 209 and Type 214 submarines included technology 
transfers from HDW [Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft].”137 Despite the late start, 19 
years after acquiring the Jangbogo-I submarines, the ROKN submarine force celebrated 
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200,000 miles of accident-free submarine operations.138 Additionally, Cho Ah-mi 
explains that “the force not only successfully conducted over 300 submarine operations, 
but participated in over 19 foreign-led exercises, displaying its ability to execute missions 
in the Pacific and India oceans.”139 South Korea not only boasts a professional and 
capable submarine force, but its submarine-building capability has matured to a level 
acknowledged by those in the region. This is supported by Indonesia’s purchase of three 
Type 209 submarines built by Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering 
(DSME) under license from Germany.140 
One reason why the ROKN was behind in establishing its subsurface forces was 
because it placed a higher priority on combating the maritime threat from the North’s 
surface forces first.141 Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Vice Admiral (ret.) 
Yoji Koda suggests that the ROKN may have been influenced to focus on the anti-surface 
fight because of Western assumptions of the KPN’s intentions.142 Another reason for the 
submarine force and later the ROKN Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities taking 
a back seat is related to the land-centric focus of the times in South Korea. Justifiably, the 
South Korean government focused on deterring the large North Korean army from 
flooding across the DMZ. This meant the army received a bigger portion of the defense 
budget over the navy during and following the Korean War. This explains Admiral Son’s 
fundraising to buy the ROKN’s first combat ship as mentioned earlier. The competition 
amongst the ROK services, coupled with a heavy reliance on U.S. naval support, 
influenced the size of the ROKN in its early stages of development.143 Thanks to the 
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recent rapid economic growth of South Korea, however, the ROKN has since managed to 
build a world-class submarine force since the mid-1980s. 
Shortly after the arrival of the first submarine in Korea, the ROKN decided to 
create a separate flotilla for its subsurface forces as Cho explains: “FLOT 9 was initially 
the 57th Submarine squadron under Flotilla 5 until its creation in on October 1, 1995.”144 
FLOT 9’s responsibilities focused on administrative matters, and the ROK Fleet 
headquarters controlled submarine operations. One of the major changes with the 
establishment of the submarine forces command is that submarine operations are now 
commanded from Jinhae.145 
The ROKN Submarine Force Command (CSF), established in 2015, serves as the 
single commander of its fleet of Type 214 and Type 209 submarines. Prior to the 
establishment of its submarine force command, ROKN submarines reported to the one 
star in charge of Submarine Flotilla Nine (FLOT 9) based in Jinhae. The small city of 
Jinhae on the southeastern corner of the South continues to be the center of submarine 
operations, as well as the location of the Submarine Force Command. The stand-up of the 
submarine force is an indicator of the newfound significance of subsurface operations, as 
well as ASW, within the ROKN. An Asian Economy article implies that the stand-up of 
the Submarine Force Command and making its leader the equivalent rank to those of the 
fleet commanders captures the rising significance of submarine operations in the 
ROKN.146 The creation of the command also aligns well with the receipt of the ninth and 
final Son Won-Il-class submarine, officially ending the second phase of its submarine 
improvement program.147 A bigger staff with the appropriate communications and 
support structure provided by the new command is necessary to support the 18 
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submarines in its inventory, as well as the nine KSS III 3,000-ton submarines scheduled 
to start production in 2020.148 
The ROKN submarine force adds to the navy’s capabilities to defend its seas and 
maintain the sea lanes of communications critical to sustaining its economy open. The 
Defense Daily explains the role of the ROKN submarines: “During war time, submarines 
observe and attack the enemy on the front lines, but during peacetime its role is to 
prevent wars and protect the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) by displaying its 
asymmetric capabilities to ensure success of the country.”149 Jane’s Sentinel Security 
Assessment adds that the submarine’s primary mission is to counter the KPN submarine 
threat and support maritime strike. These are in addition anti-surface operations to defend 
its surrounding seas. Although the ROKN submarine’s main mission is to counter KPN 
submarines, Bruce Klingner mentions that  
the greatest South Korean vulnerability continues to be from North Korean 
submarines. Despite post-Cheonan efforts, ROK ASW capabilities remain 
limited due to low manning, insufficient sonobuoys, outdated sensors and 
weapons, and insufficient C4I capabilities, particularly interoperability 
with U.S. forces.150  
Vice Admiral (ret.) Yoji Koda explains that “with respect to ASW, however, it 
was inadequate, even after the introduction of the three KDX-I destroyers and the Lynx 
helicopter. The ASW posture of the ROKN still remains questionable today, in relation to 
the perceived threat of North Korean submarines and the geopolitical nature of the 
country.”151 Recommended remedies for the weakness in ASW will be covered later on 
in the chapter, but it is important to remember that ROKN submarines undoubtedly have 
the technological advantage over KPN submarines in sensors, weapons and navigation 
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systems, but the force’s relatively young age, complex environment, and limitations in 
current technology continue to challenge the force from successfully countering the KPN 
subsurface threat. 
2. ROKN Submarine Order of Battle 
The ROKN operates some of the world’s technologically advanced submarines 
today. The Jangbogo I and Il submarines make up the ROKN’s submarine force. The 
navy received delivery of its ninth Jangbogo II (Type 214) class submarine on September 
7, 2017.152 This delivery marks the end of the second phase of the ROKN submarine 
improvement program, which set an ambitious goal of acquiring nine Jangbogo II 
submarines by 2018 and upgrading its Jangbogo I submarines.153 The delivery of the 
Republic of Korea Ship (ROKS) Shin Dol-suk brings the ROKN submarine inventory to 
18 diesel-electric attack submarines: nine Type 209s and nine Type 214s.154 The South is 
planning on replacing the midget submarines with a newer class of midget submarines in 
the third phase of its submarine program.155 
The Jangbogo I class (Type 209) submarines served as the first ROKN subsurface 
unit capable of extended operations. As mentioned before, the 209s were purchased from 
the Germans to counter the KPN submarine force.156 Kim explains that  
the ROK Navy introduced Jangbogo I class submarine 209, which was 
built in Germany, in 1992. This was the beginning of the ROK Navy to 
secure underwater operational ability. Although the ROK Navy secured 
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and employed midget submarines in 1980s, those submarines had many 
limitations… for the ROK Navy to operate… [them] for covert operations 
for a long term.157  
The 209s thwart the competition with their newer technology, size, weapons systems, and 
quality of their crew. But, the submarine is not the best asset to conduct wide-area 
searches in support of the ASW mission. This is especially the case with the Jangbogo I 
class because it is limited to hull-mounted sensors as its primary acoustic source to detect 
the enemy. The hull-mounted sensors, combined with the effects of shallow waters of the 
West Sea, essentially remove the submarine’s ability to detect KPN submarines operating 
on the battery at a range considered to be an advantage. Unless the adversary is 
snorkeling to charge its battery, it is more likely that the ROKN’s first flight submarines 
will not detect their target until it is too late, as they are passing each other. This scenario 
is likely the case in the East Sea as well because it is believed that the KPN midget 
submarines will remain close to the coasts rather than heading out to the open ocean as 
they enter ROKN waters. KPN submarine littoral operations minimize the technological 
advances of the 209s. Regrettably, the advantages of the first flight Jangbogo submarines 
only provide a platform with better armament and extended operations compared to the 
Dolgorae class submarines. This does not, however, mean that the submarines are 
incapable of carrying out their anti-surface warfare mission. Due to the louder nature of 
KPN surface ships and the ROKN’s ability to detect ships via multiple sources, ROKN 
submarines maintain the advantage to strike first. Upgraded hardware and software will 
definitely improve the submarine’s ability to execute its anti-surface and SLOC control 
missions, but without a breakthrough in passive SONAR technology, it is unlikely that 
they will improve their ASW capability. In the deep waters of the East Sea, any upgrades 
will improve initial detection ranges, but that will require the KPN submarines to venture 
further out into the open ocean. 
Type 214 submarines are significantly more advanced compared not only to the 
KPN’s submarines, but also compared to the Jangbogo Is. The new class boasts an 
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advertised ability to track up to 300 contacts at once, remain submerged up to two weeks 
without recharging, and launch cruise missiles to support maritime strike operations.158 
The Chosun Ilbo exclaimed that “it is touted as one of the world’s quietest 
submarines.”159 One of the main improvements to the new flight is the advent of the air-
independent propulsion (AIP). This new technology coupled with improved battery cells 
is what enables longer submerged operations, allowing the unit to maximize its stealth 
and minimize counter-detection.160 The 214s also boast the capability to conduct 
maritime strikes. With extremely short warning and reaction time to military operations 
on the Korean Peninsula, the added ability to strike strategic North Korean targets with 
little to no warning provides the South with pre-emptive or preventative options. As 
mentioned before, however, executing such options would require a change in current 
ROKN procedures to allow its forces to operate north of the NLL. Regardless, having the 
ability to conduct such strikes could help level the playing field against the massive 
number of Northern artillery pieces pre-positioned or against weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) sites in the North. 
3. Acquisition and Industry 
The ROK’s military industry includes general shipbuilding, which operates and 
competes at the international level. Its submarine-building history goes back to the mid-
1980s with the production of its Dolgorae class midget submarines.161 As Yang explains, 
“the National Defense Science Research Center established the foundation for submarine 
production and played a critical role in advancements in ROKN subsurface 
weaponry.”162 Since the launching of the Dolgorae, the ROK’s shipbuilding industry—
carried out by Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) and Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine 
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Engineering (DSME)—has produced 19 submarines in total.163 Vice Admiral Koda’s 
comment accurately captures the extraordinary feat the ROKN accomplished in just over 
25 years: “The ROKN, which had started its submarine force from nothing, paved the 
way to a real undersea-warfare capability—establishing training procedures for the 
crews, developing operational concepts, and learning the technology needed for building 
diesel-electric submarines.”164 The industry is now exporting submarines to other nations 
in the region.165 
The ROK government operates a robust acquisition program to supplement any 
technology they do not have at this time. The Defense Acquisition Program 
Administration (DAPA) is the organization responsible for coordinating any and all 
imports for the ROK military. DAPA’s website lists in mission function as: acquisition 
planning; defense industry promotion and export cooperation; analysis, testing and 
evaluation; defense improvement project management; and military supplies and contract 
management.166  
a. Indigenous Submarine Production Program 
South Korea has a robust, capable, and ambitious submarine-building program, 
producing one of the world’s quietest submarines. The ROKN’s purchase of the Cosmos 
and operation of Dolgorae midget submarines served as a precursor to acquire and 
develop the technology and industry for its latest class of Jangbogo III attack submarines. 
As explained by Koda, “the ROKN selected the German-developed Type 209 submarine 
for its first-generation submarine (known as the Chang Bogo class). The navy imported 
the first boat; the South Korean shipbuilding industry assembled the second and the third 
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boats; and the fourth was built in country, from keel laying to final fitting-out.”167 The 
technology transfer and experience from building the Jangbogo submarine enabled the 
industry to then go on and build the follow-on Type 214 with help from the Germans. 
Unlike its predecessor, all nine of the Son Won-Il class boats were built by HHI and 
DSME. ROKN is not finished with building submarines. The submarine force has 
initiated a three-phase submarine modernization plan. Jane’s explains that Phase 1 is to 
upgrade the Jangbogo I boats; Phase 2 will include the production of nine Jangbogo II 
submarines as well as up to nine 3,000 ton KSS 3 or Jangbogo III submarines; and final 
Phase 3 will replace the midget submarine force with a new class.168 It is anticipated that 
Jangbogo III submarines will replace the aging Type 209s. 
As mentioned before, the ROK submarine industry has matured to the point of 
exporting its technology to other countries, as well as providing maintenance. Moon Kun-
shik, a professor at the Hannam University, explains that with the ROK’s sale of its 
submarines to Indonesia “it not only joins eight other countries with capabilities to export 
them, but stands amongst Germany, France, Russia, and Sweden who actually sell them 
around the world.”169 All the while, Kim Jong-Min explains that the ROK continues to 
build its fleet of next-generation submarines, further solidifying its building expertise. He 
explains: “In 2000, the ROK government decided on the German 214 class submarine as 
the ROK Navy’s main submarine and the ROK Navy built one 214 class submarine in 
each year sequentially from 2007.”170 Kim also explains the country’s desire to build a 
new class of submarines that will certainly test its shipbuilding ability:  
The ROK Navy is pushing forwards a plan to secure the 3,000-ton class 
Jangbogo-III submarine as following a [sic] 214 class submarine. Based 
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on submarine building capability from [the] 209 and 214 classes 
submarines, it is estimated that the ROKS Jangbogo-III submarine’s 
equipments and systems including combat system, detecting system and 
embarked weapons will be domestically produced.171  
Successful completion of the Jangbogo III will certainly be an engineering feat for 
a country that knew nothing about building submarines just some 30 years ago. A quote 
from Jane’s accurately captures the industry and the Navy’s continued desire for 
innovation and to push its ambitions to the limit: “It is nevertheless known that the navy 
intends to seek a submarine capable of operating further from South Korean shores, either 
by upgrading the Chang Bogo class or introducing a new type.”172 It will be interesting to 
see the changes the ROK’s 3,000-ton submarine could bring once it is finished sometime 
around 2020. Finally, to take shipbuilding to the next level as a response to the North, 
many in the ROK are discussing options of building their own nuclear submarines.173 
This will certain push the ROK’s abilities to the limit, likely resulting in outreach to those 
countries with experience building nuclear submarines. 
b. Potential Integration of Non-traditional Subsurface Forces 
Technological advances today provide alternative options to overcome challenges 
in the subsurface domain. The advent of computers with complex communications 
equipment enable coordination among air, surface, and subsurface assets, bringing 
multiple domains to support the fight beneath the waters. Perrett and Sweetman explain 
that “facing great difficulty in finding North Korean submarines, the South Korean navy 
is pushing for a big increase in its maritime aviation force…. The country will have a 
force of 16 upgraded Lockheed Martin P-3 Orion maritime aircraft by 2018.”174 Aircraft 
present a significant threat for submarines due to their ability to quickly get on top of a 
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submarine’s reported position. Though their time on station is limited and significantly 
shorter than a surface ship or submarine, 16 aircraft would enable the ROKN to provide 
over 10 hours of continuous coverage in an area with suspected submarine operations. 
Unmanned aerial and submerged vehicles are another recent invention that could 
play a big part in ASW for the ROKN. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) could be used 
in conjunction with Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) or by themselves to increase KPN 
submarine detection. Their smaller size and smaller engines provide a smaller and quieter 
target for detection by KPN submarines, enabling a UAV to track the submarine for 
constant targeting data. During wartime scenarios, UAV operations would provide early 
warning of KPN submarine locations without the dangers of losing an aircraft and its 
crew prior to taking out the North’s coastal defense cruise missile sites. UUVs provides 
the same type of advantages to the ROKN, allowing presence without the dangers of 
losing the crew in contested or uncontested waters at a relatively cheaper price. For the 
numerically inferior South, a fleet of UUVs could serve to keep tabs on the numerous 
KPN submarines, providing continuous or periodic contact reports for other manned 
platforms to engage once available. This would be ideal for use against the KPN SSB if 
that program comes to fruition. Finally, UUVs can also be utilized to infiltrate deep into 
the North without needing to snorkel in to obtain the much-needed environmental data 
for the ROKN. As mentioned before, local environmental data can help ensure weapons 
and sensor optimization to maximize effectiveness against the North. 
Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) have been around for a while in the United 
States. SOSUS is another wide-area search capability that would provide cueing for the 
ROKN to detect KPN submarines. The ROKN’s SOSUS system would allow operators 
on land to surveil its surrounding waters without putting crews at risk. The only 
drawback to the system is that shallow water effects would have the same impact on 
performance as they do for submarines and other naval platforms. As Vice Admiral Koda 
points out, “the ROKN has been continuously modernizing its fleet, but its wide-area 
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ocean-surveillance capability—which is indispensable to both coastal defense and blue-
water operations—does not look sufficient at present.”175  
Finally, a ROKN nuclear submarine is an option available to the South to 
overcome the growing threat from the KPN’s SSB and SLBM program.176 The 
significantly long on-station time provided by a nuclear submarine will surely provide an 
advantage for the South. However, they may not be worth the cost of designing, building, 
operating, and maintaining a nuclear boat. As mentioned by Zachary Keck and Henry 
Sokolski, “South Korea could acquire nuclear submarines…by buying or leasing 
American-built SSNs…[but] a more realistic option is for South Korea to build its 
own.”177 Buying or leasing an SSN from the United States is highly unlikely due to the 
U.S. Navy’s close hold on its nuclear technology. Additionally, South Korea’s recent 
compromise of Top-Secret material to the North, and its attempted cover-up, strengthens 
the USN’s reluctance to sell the technology.178 Plus, with the ROKN’s Son Won-Il class 
submarines being able to remain submerged for greater than two weeks, this capability 
should provide sufficient on-station time to defend against the KPN SSBs. The funds an 
effort required to build a Korean-built nuclear submarine would be better spent on buying 
more diesel submarines or investing in improving current battery technology. 
C. EVOLUTION OF ROKN ASW TACTICS AND STRATEGY 
1. Before the ROKS Cheonan Incident 
ASW is not a submarine-only warfare area. It is true that the best platform to go 
against a submarine is another submarine, but the submarine is not necessarily the best 
platform to initially detect another submarine. ASW, dubbed “awfully slow warfare” by 
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some, captures the time-intensive nature of the pursuit. Finding a needle in a haystack 
takes time, especially when the environmental conditions and human factors are included. 
Therefore, by combining surface, air, and subsurface assets available to the navy, the 
awfully slow process speeds up. Placing multiple sensors from surface ships, helicopters, 
airplanes and submarines in an area suspected of containing an enemy subsurface unit 
increases the probability of finding a submarine. Multiple sensors finding the same 
contact allows for triangulation of the enemy providing an accurate position for friendly 
forces to exploit. One of the many difficulties in ASW is the coordination of all the 
different assets partaking in the hunt. Controlling the different assets operating in 
different domains requires significant communication capabilities and expertise in the 
different warfare areas. Additionally, the limited communication options beneath the 
water present challenges for coordinating with friendly submarines. For that reason, 
traditionally in the ROK, the ROKN Operations Command, also known and ROK Fleet, 
played the role of the overall ASW commander. First, Second, and Third Fleets served as 
the on-scene commanders but, mainly due to their lack of subsurface picture, they had to 
reach back to ROK Fleet for coordination with friendly submarines. As Perrett and 
Sweetman comment on the ROKN’s limited ability to detect KPN submarines, citing an 
ROK legislator: “South Korean warships detected only 28% of North Korean submarines 
that exercised in the first quarter of 2010….”179  
Before Cheonan, the ROKN focused on securing its blue-water capabilities. Its 
ambition before the sinking was focused outward to the rest of the region and the world. 
As Yoon explains, 
Before the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of 
Yeonpyeong-do, the ROKN’s naval operational concepts focused on large, 
widely dispersed naval warfare, mainly conducted on the high seas i.e., 
deep water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) 
and anti-surface warfare (ASuW).180  
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Although the common belief is that the Jangbogo submarines were acquired for 
the ASW mission, as discussed above, they are better as ASuW platforms. Their bigger 
size and armament, compared to the Dolgorae midget submarines, make them sea-worthy 
in many of the world’s oceans, supporting the ROKN’s desire to push beyond the Korean 
Peninsula. FLOT 9’s motto at the time was: “To the Sea, To the World.” This was also 
supported by President Lee Myung-bak’s decision to participate in the anti-piracy 
operations near the Gulf of Aden, making it the ROKN’s first mission outside of the 
Korean Peninsula.181 Jane’s also observes that “one year after the corvette was lost, the 
RoKN is having to balance its blue water ambitions with the need to construct an 
effective counter to littoral asymmetric threats.”182 It is not that the ROKN was not 
concerned about the KPN submarine problem, but that they believed they had it under 
control, and therefore focused on its blue-water goals. 
The ROKN did not completely disregard ASW or shallow water operations. 
Forbes and Yoon state that “between 1970 and 1990 the ROKN conducted combined 
submarine exercises with the U.S. Navy, and since 1997 has also focused on Ship ASW 
Readiness and Evaluation Measurement (SHAREM) [sic].”183 The problem with these 
exercises was that they were driven by the surface commands in the ROK, instead of the 
submarine commands. FLOT 9 mostly provided a real submarine for the surface ships to 
detect and track, as opposed to getting involved in the planning of tactics and strategy. 
Additionally, although exercises in areas of possible conflicts in the future best prepare 
the crews, these exercises did not reflect reality because operating in excessively shallow 
water unnecessarily jeopardizes the crew of the submarine. Forbes and Yoon clearly 
spells out that “as demonstrated by the ROKS Cheonan, the ROKN does not have the 
requisite capability (or number of vessels) to sufficiently interdict North Korean midget 
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submarines in shallow waters.”184 Unfortunately, the 46 lives lost in the sinking of the 
Cheonan served as the wake-up call for the ROKN to realize the extent of its weakness in 
this area and make improvements.  
2. Post-ROKS Cheonan Incident 
Significant changes followed the notorious sinking of the Cheonan in the West 
Sea near the Northwest islands. As Jane’s points out, the incident “exposed weaknesses 
in the South’s early warning, command, control and intelligence and anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) capabilities as well as a general lack of preparedness to counter 
unexpected threats.”185 Forbes and Yoon explain that in recognizing its weaknesses, the 
government altered its strategy to include “a more active deterrent posture (particularly 
against submarines); enhancement of the ROK- U.S. alliance; revising the self-restraining 
RoE; reinforcement of assets to defend the five islands in the disputed NLL; and 
increasing the defence budget to acquire more hard power-oriented capabilities.”186 
Especially in the ASW realm, the ROKN intends to increase surveillance of KPN 
submarine bases, develop an early warning system, and acquire technologically advanced 
assets to assist in combating the threat.187 These efforts indicate the South’s realization of 
the importance of ASW in protecting its seas. Other initiatives in improving defense were 
accomplished with procedural changes. 
Previous restrictions on the on-scene commander were removed following the 
Cheonan incident. Yoon explains that “the ROKN has changed its combat readiness 
posture to become more robust… to allow more importance to be granted to the right of 
self-defense…. In consequence, more authority has been delegated from senior levels of 
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the ROKN to commanders on the scene.”188 Although this revision is a step in the right 
direction, it does not apply to all ASW scenarios. For example, this procedural change 
makes sense for scenarios against surface and air units where the enemy’s identity is 
clear. However, in the opaque subsurface realm, where positive identification of the 
enemy is murky at best, it may carry with it unintended consequences. Initial detection 
ranges in shallow waters can be very short, but with the environmental factors and traffic 
density off the Korean Peninsula, this could make the ranges even shorter, which 
ultimately means less time to react. Although the regulation provides latitude for the unit 
commander to determine if an action is required for self-defense, it is significantly harder 
to decipher the enemy’s intent when you can barely hear him, let alone physically locate 
him. The margin for error is comparatively greater in the subsurface realm.  
The above scenario is for submarine versus submarine, but how does the calculus 
for self-defense change for a KPN submarine versus a ROKN surface ship? Due to the 
clandestine nature of submarine operations, it is highly likely that the surface ship will 
not know the whereabouts of friendly submarines. The ship has to reach out to higher 
headquarters as it attempts to determine if the unidentified submarine is one of its own or 
not. Even if it figures out that it is not one of its own, that does not automatically make it 
a KPN submarine. With the proliferation of submarines and proximity to China and 
Japan, depending on the location, the sub may or may not be from the North. During 
these trying times of figuring out the origins of the submarine, how does the sinking of 
the Cheonan impact the unit commander? The implication is that the change in policy, 
although made with good intentions, combined with previous KPN behavior, 
significantly lowers the margin for error, possibly leading to bigger problems. Alison 
Evans’ description of the South’s revised doctrine underlines the uncertainties and raises 
concerns: “South Korea’s new doctrine…allows its armed forces to pre-emptively strike 
North Korean targets, rather than only meet an attack with proportional response.”189 
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Additionally, Geoffrey Till hints at the potential for rash and hasty decisions by unit 
commanders associated with instant retaliation to provocations: “We will instantly 
retaliate against any provocation from now on and wrap up our operation at the scene of 
the provocation.”190 The strong stance against KPN submarine operations in the South 
continues with the current leadership. A reporter for Defense Daily quoted Admiral Um, 
the ROKN Chief of Naval Operations, during a visit to the ROKN Submarine Force 
Command as saying, “‘Submarines are the daggers of the undersea domain, and as the 
silent assassins of the country, they need to be ready for the nation’s calling no matter the 
time or mission, and quietly and flawlessly accomplish its mission.’ Additionally, he 
stressed the importance of sinking enemy submarine in the event of infiltration or 
provocation.”191 Although the change came about for justifiable reason, the vengeful 
origins of the change carry with them a recipe for escalation. 
The ROKN and its submarine force have evolved into a technologically advanced 
capable force recognized around the world. However, even with the ROKN’s advanced 
ships, aircraft, and submarines, the force continues to struggle with defending against the 
North’s subsurface threats. The South’s attempts to strengthen this weak area in its 
defense came at the cost of 46 lives of the crew of the ROKS Cheonan. The ROKN’s 
inventory of ASW forces capable of detecting KPN submarines remains limited to its 
AEGIS destroyers, P-3 Orion aircraft, Lynx helicopters, and Type 214 submarines. The 
platforms have the capability to deal with the KPN submarine threat in small numbers, 
but the limited number of platforms may be insufficient to deal with the entirety of the 
North’s submarine force. Its platforms, besides the P-3s, are not wide area search 
platforms, therefore they do not address the weakness in early detection and warning. The 
sinking of the Cheonan, and the ROKN’s realization for the need to strengthen its ASW 
capability, has led to various efforts in dealing with the subsurface threats through 
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acquisition, training, and cooperation with its allies. This chapter highlighted the 
unilateral efforts by the ROKN and their limited effectiveness in the subsurface domain. 
The next chapter will focus on the ROKN’s interaction with the subsurface forces of the 
United States in the Western Pacific in combating the KPN submarine threat. 
  
 61 
IV. CURRENT AND FUTURE COOPERATION WITH ALLIED 
SUBMARINE FORCES 
As a global force, the U.S. Navy (USN) conducts many operations around the 
world. In recent history, the Western Pacific has stolen the spotlight from other regions of 
the world. This new focus on the Pacific has resulted in shifting portions of the U.S. 
military to the region.192 This chapter explains the United States submarine presence in 
the region and its interactions with the ROKN submarine force. Then, it identifies and 
analyzes a few areas of possible future cooperation between the two navies to improve 
ASW capabilities. The chapter also discusses the specific impacts of the KPN submarine 
force on ROKN ASW and U.S. involvement to assist. Finally, possible ROK-U.S.-Japan 
cooperation will be explored in the context of the common threat posed by North Korea’s 
provocative military activities.  
A. U.S. UNDERSEA FORCES IN THE REGION 
The most technically advanced submarine force in the world, the USN boasts a 
force of 71 nuclear-powered submarines.193 The Navy divides its forces into the Pacific 
and the Atlantic Oceans, but due to their worldwide deployments, the U.S. submarine 
presence is all over the globe. Boats in the Pacific conduct deployments to the Indo-
Pacific areas. During the six-month-long Western Pacific (WestPac) deployments, the 
boats conduct various missions in support of the nation’s priorities. All submarine 
operations west of the international dateline to the Indian Ocean are overseen by 
Commander Submarine Group 7 (CSG7) based in Yokosuka, Japan. Commander 
Submarine Force Pacific Fleet’s (CSP) website explains that “Submarine Group 7 was 
established during the Korean Crisis in the 1950’s as Submarine Group Western Pacific,” 
dating U.S. submarine force interaction with the ROKN to the Korean war.194 The 
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commander is also responsible for submarine operations in the 5th Fleet Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) as the Commander of Task Force 54 (CTF 54). The CSP 
homepage also explains, “Group 7 is comprised of submarines deployed to the Western 
Pacific and a permanent, forward-deployed fleet including the submarine tenders USS 
Frank Cable (AS-40) and USS Emory S. Land (AS-39), and four fast-attack nuclear 
submarines assigned to Commander, Submarine Squadron 15, when deployed from 
Guam.”195 CSG 7, as a command, does not have forces permanently assigned, rather, it is 
provided with a continuous rotation of all the fast attack submarines homeported in the 
Pacific to accomplish its missions. The constant stream of new units ensures seamless 
presence in the region. Of the many missions assigned to CSG 7, it works with other 
submarine forces in the region to promote peace and stability from the subsurface 
domain. As will be discussed in more detail, the command, with the submarines assigned, 
accomplish their mission by conducting exercises with the various submarine forces in 
the region, enhancing interoperability, improving general submarine operations by 
establishing and encouraging undersea norms, and ensuring access to sea lanes of 
communications. The two closest relationships in the region are with the Japanese and 
Korean submarine forces. Due to the headquarters being stationed in Japan, the command 
interacts closely with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) submarine 
force. The CSG 7 also has a long history with the ROKN submarine force. 
CSG 7 has been working closely with the ROKN submarine force since the 
establishment of Flotilla 9 in 1994.196 As described by Jane’s, “the South Korean 
submarine service interacts very closely with its USN counterpart through exercises and 
the flag-level Submarine Warfare Committee Meetings, where tactics, force integration 
and future submarine developments are discussed.”197 The two subsurface forces 
cooperate on a daily basis to promote submarine safety and development. As explained 
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by USN LT Lauren Gaidry, Squadron 15 Public Affairs Officer, the relationship between 
the two forces grew through what was once called the Brotherhood Agreement which 
was later renamed the Submarine Warfare Committee Meeting (SWCM). As she 
explains: “Established in 1994 during the birth of the ROKN submarine fleet, the SWCM 
has evolved into a discussion between U.S. and ROKN submarine forces on submarine 
tactics, force integration, and future submarine development.”198 This biennial meeting 
with the ROKN’s highest-ranking operational submarine officer and the commander of 
all submarine operations in the 7th Fleet AOR plays a significant role in enhancing both 
countries’ submarine operations. RADM Youn Jeong Sang (ROKN’s first CSF 
commander) mentioned during SWCM 43 that the ROKN submarine force has benefited 
tremendously from its relationship with CSG 7.199 Although FLOT 9 has expanded its 
role as the ROKN Submarine Force Command, its relationship with CSG 7 will continue 
to flourish and strengthen as the two forces work closely to solve the KPN subsurface 
problem. 
B. UNDERSEA ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION 
CSG 7’s missions include combat readiness, regional presence, and capability 
development.200 For many military forces, the priority is to enhance its own readiness 
and capability, but for the United States a significant amount of effort is also invested in 
to improving allied capabilities as well. U.S. submarines participate in multiple exercises 
throughout the year with ROKN submarines. The submarine-only exercises provide an 
excellent opportunity for U.S. units to detect and track high-end diesel submarines, while 
providing ROKN crews an opportunity to do the same against high-end nuclear 
submarines. Another aspect of the exercises is that it provides a medium to test and 
validate tactics and techniques. Because the two forces operate two different types of 
submarines, nuclear and conventional, old tactics for one force may be new to the other. 
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The exercises also enforce subsurface norms to improve submarine safety, as well as 
improving interoperability in the region. Additionally, because these exercises occur 
around the Korean Peninsula, they also serve to familiarize U.S. submarine crews on a 
potential battlefield in the future. As mentioned in previous chapters, prior understanding 
of the environment’s effects on sensors and weapons can provide a significant advantage. 
The two forces also take part in other exercises hosted by surface or air components of 
the two navies around the Korean Peninsula. These type of “full-spectrum ASW” 
exercises are critical to improving interoperability between the two navies, but they also 
help identify problem areas. For example, in a communication-heavy operation like 
ASW, the ROKN and USN units’ inability to communicate directly via secure channels 
because they lack the required equipment hinders efficient execution of the mission and 
creates chances for error. Communication is not the only area of concern with ROKN 
ASW. 
The submarine infiltrations into the South by the KPN in the late 1990s were the 
first indication of the weaknesses of the ROKN’s ASW program. But the limits of 
funding and importance of hedging against land threats trumped the need to address 
ASW capabilities. Unfortunately, not until the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010 did the 
issue of ASW take center stage. With virtually little to no modifications to its submarine 
fleet, one KPN midget submarine upset the entire ROKN ASW program, resulting in a 
change and strategic review of the ROKN to address the question: How was it that a 
midget submarine with inferior technology was capable of sinking a ROKN corvette and 
freely entered and left ROKN territorial waters at will? Jane’s pointed out that the sinking 
“exposed weaknesses in the South’s early warning, command, control and intelligence 
and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities as well as a general lack of preparedness 
to counter unexpected threats.”201 To bolster its weak areas, the ROKN established a new 
command, created a new committee, and enhanced its inventory of ASW assets.  
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With the establishment of the ROKN Submarine Force Command (CSF) in 2015, 
the responsibility for submarine operations shifted from the ROK Fleet to the CSF.202 
This was a significant shift in command and control of ROKN submarines. ASW requires 
a strong command and control infrastructure and team to quarterback the assets assigned 
to accomplish the mission. Once an enemy submarine is detected, the ASW commander 
needs to determine what asset assigned is most fit to accomplish the task. If the desire is 
to take it out, the commander has multiple platforms to consider. If the objective is to 
keep tabs on the enemy, then other assets are better at accomplishing that task. For 
example, during peacetime, it is more likely that the commander will desire to know the 
location of the enemy submarine at all times, but not destroy it. In this situation, it would 
be best to use an AIP boat, due to its longer on-station time. A nuclear submarine, which 
the ROKN is considering the option of building, would provide the longest on-station 
time, but the advantages of unlimited duration do not outweigh the costs associated with 
building, maintaining, and operating a nuclear boat. If the KPN submarine’s endurance is 
one week, a nuclear submarine with unlimited endurance does not provide much of an 
advantage over an AIP with an endurance of one month. If a submarine is not 
immediately available, the commander can decide to use surface ships or Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft (MPA), in that order, because of the aircraft’s on-station time. Other 
considerations include sensor capabilities on the different platforms available for the 
prosecution. The bottom line is that the commander on-shore is responsible for making 
such decision, as opposed to the on-scene commander. Because of the various platforms 
involved, it is best to ensure that representatives from the different communities provide 
expertise to the ASW command center. Once the decision has been made, the 
commander’s desires need to be communicated to the units on the scene. This requires 
robust communication capabilities to all assets participating. The communications 
between units and the commander become even more important when engagements 
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against the enemy occur. Clear and concise communications can mean the difference 
between shooting the enemy or shooting a friendly submarine.  
Efforts to improve ROKN ASW continue. In 2014, the senior leaders in the 
ROKN and USN navies agreed to and signed a new charter to enhance ASW with the 
ROKN. As the U.S. Pacific Fleet webpage reported, “Vice Admiral Robert L. Thomas, 
U.S. 7th Fleet and Vice Admiral Jung Ho-sub, Commander of the Republic of Korea 
Fleet, sign[ed] a charter pledging cooperation in anti-submarine warfare.”203 This was an 
effort from the leadership to continue the close relationship between the two navies, 
while addressing the problems with ASW.204 The ASW committee, jointly hosted by 
ROK Fleet and the U.S. Seventh Fleet, brings the air, surface, and subsurface 
communities and their expertise and capabilities to bear on the KPN subsurface problem. 
As mentioned by Commander Naval Forces Korea’s (CNFK) assistant chief of staff for 
security cooperation, the combined meetings and exercises improve both navies’ warfare 
capabilities.205 Although still a relatively new line of effort from the two navies, the 
committee possesses considerable potential to improve ASW capabilities and 
interoperability for both navies. 
Prior to the charter, the ROKN and USN had conducted bilateral exercises 
focusing on ASW and other maritime tactics since the 1970s.206 Starting in the late 1990s 
the ROKN started participating in a shallow-water ASW centric exercise called the Ship 
ASW Readiness/Effectiveness Measurement (SHAREM).207 Other than SHAREM, USN 
Petty Officer 2nd Class Brian McReynolds explains that the two submarine forces also 
execute exercise SILENT SHARK to “integrate U.S. and Republic of Korean anti-
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submarine warfare assets to bolster relations and interoperability.”208 During this 
exercise, the ROKN and USN submarines practice ASW with surface ships as well as 
submarine versus submarine events.209 SILENT SHARK presents a different 
environment for the ROKN submarines, as the exercise takes place in waters surrounding 
Guam. Through the exercises, the two submarine forces develop and refine specific 
procedures and conduct experiments to continue to push the envelope on subsurface 
tactics and engagements. The same types of exercises happen in the ROKN air and 
surface domains with their counterparts for the same purpose. These exercises are those 
that will enable safe and successful combined execution of ASW operations against the 
KPN submarine fleet in battle. 
Another area of ASW reform in the wake of the Cheonan sinking is in the ROKN 
procurement of ASW technology. Korea Times reports that “the service [ROKN] will 
also speed up efforts to acquire high-tech naval defense systems, in particular anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) equipment. Key procurement items include minesweepers, 
anti-submarine helicopters and sonar systems.”210 Yoon explains that “the ROK needs to 
urgently re-establish sea control of its littorals, which will require new naval capability to 
counter maritime attacks by the KPN. This will take the form of complex and 
sophisticated ASW and mine counter measures (MCM) in shallow waters.”211 Jane’s 
quotes an unnamed Yonhap News Agency military source elaborating on the ROKN 
looking at the international market to acquire the technology required for detecting KPN 
submarines.212 Some of the technologies include, but are not limited to: U.S. S-3 Viking 
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ASW aircraft,213 unmanned surveillance aircraft,214 and Italian AW-159 Wildcat 
helicopters.215 In addition to the purchase of Vikings, Jane’s reports that “the South 
Korean military may buy four Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft in the 
wake of the successful test-firing of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) by 
North Korea.”216 The increase in navy air assets should better equip the ROKN to 
respond to KPN submarine threats. 
Simultaneously, as it looks to foreign markets for technology, the ROKN is 
asking its own industry for weapons and platforms. Chosun Ilbo announced the South’s 
anti-submarine torpedo, Hongsangeo (Red Shark), explaining that “the Hongsangeo is an 
anti-submarine missile that is launched vertically to avoid detection by enemy 
submarines and to increase its range. The torpedo is dropped by parachute near the 
intended target. After release, the torpedo falls into the water and independently searches 
for the target.”217 In order to improve its early-warning capabilities, Perrett and 
Sweetman report that “South Korea is reportedly installing a fixed underwater acoustic-
detection chain.”218 This is significant because this type of system, if it exists, addresses 
the lack of wide-area search capabilities for the ROKN. This can be further integrated 
into a network of underwater sensors and platforms to improve subsurface awareness. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the ROK government is exploring options for 
building its own nuclear submarines. The desire to build an ROKN nuclear submarine is 
not a new concept. A Korea Times article explains that “the Navy has worked on a 
nuclear submarine program, the ‘362 Project,’ after it was approved by then-President 
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Roh Moo-hyun in June 2003.”219 This information carries with it two important points: 
that the desire for a nuclear submarine stemmed from the highest position in the ROK 
government and, as mentioned in the same article, that Roh’s chief of staff Moon, who is 
the current president, “appears to have a desire to revive Roh’s pursuit of [ROKN] 
nuclear submarines.”220 For this to become reality, however, many challenges need to be 
met first. But, with the North’s continued efforts at obtaining SLBM capabilities, a 
supportive ROKN population, and an administration in favor of the idea, the potential for 
the initiative gaining momentum is greater than ever. Conversely, others think that the 
ROK’s investment in a nuclear submarine would be a mistake. The cost of building or 
buying a nuclear submarine for the ROKN is estimated to be around the neighborhood of 
$2.5 billion.221 This estimate does not include the costs associated with maintaining 
nuclear submarines. Thus, the ROKN needs to weigh the environmental, political, 
economic, and military costs and benefits to determine if nuclear submarines are really 
the right choice. Many in the United States believe a ROKN nuclear-powered submarine 
is unnecessary, especially when their Son Won-Il submarines are capable of achieving 
similar results at a cheaper cost. Additionally, the ROK-built Jangbogo III submarine due 
to be commissioned in the 2020 timeframe will improve the ROKN’s ability to counter 
the various KPN threats.  
The ROKN clearly understands its current limitations in the ASW fight. The 
initiatives mentioned do not include all the different options the ROKN is pursuing, but 
indicate the range of options that are being considered. They also represent a difference 
in approach to ASW prior to the sinking of the Cheonan. Bruce Klingner captures some 
of the other efforts being proposed by the ROK to defend against the KPN submarine 
threat: 
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South Korea is devoting resources to defeat submarines after they depart 
their bases and enter South Korean waters. But Seoul is also considering 
the need to attack North Korean submarine bases prior to the submarines 
departing. This approach would be consistent with Seoul’s newly 
announced preemptive deterrence strategy. Since the North Korean attack 
on Cheonan, there has been greater advocacy to change the South  Korean 
military policy from passive defense to proactive deterrence. A South 
Korean presidential committee on military reforms proposed that Seoul 
adopt an operational plan that allows preemptive strikes on North Korean 
bases if South Korea sees signs of impending aggression.222 
The combination of technological and procedural improvements will significantly reform 
the ROKN’s ASW capability commensurate for a navy of its stature and the rising threat 
level it faces. The initiatives in place should build a balanced ASW fleet better suited to 
combat infiltrations and provocations from the KPN.223 
Following the sinking of the Cheonan, the ROKN and USN coordinated joint 
exercises to send a signal to the KPN about the enduring strength of the relationship 
between the two navies. Andrew Forbes and Yoon Sukjoon report that “it was quickly 
agreed that the ROKN and the U.S. Navy would conduct an anti-submarine warfare 
exercise in the West Sea, to improve the ability of the ROKN to defend against KPN 
underwater attacks,”224 but the exercise also contained clear signals of the U.S. 
commitment to the South’s defense to the North. Lately, the exercises also serve as a 
“show of force” to the North.  
All the efforts mentioned above pertain to local or platform upgrades and some 
initiatives with the United States, but what the ROKN still lacks critical to ASW is a 
wide-area sensor. Vice Admiral Koda provides an excellent analogy of the ROKN’s 
current ASW capabilities: “The ROKN has built robust submarine and destroyer 
forces…in figurative language, its ‘spear.’ However, the navy has yet to improve the 
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wide-area ocean surveillance that it must develop in order to point and thrust this 
spear.”225 This, in addition to other capabilities, may be a future area of cooperation 
between the USN and ROKN to further improve ASW on the Korean Peninsula.  
Today’s North Korean submarine inventory looks similar to its composition back 
in the mid-1990s. The ROKN learned, through the capture of KPN midget submarines in 
the late 1990s, that technology remained relatively stagnant as well, with the exception of 
minor improvements from the integration of commercial navigation and communication 
equipment. Yet, the mostly outdated and archaic KPN submarines have been able to take 
advantage of their rudimentary design and combine it with the crew’s knowledge of the 
littoral environment to successfully evade significantly more advanced ROKN units. The 
realization of the KPN submarine problem led to the creation of a USN-ROKN ASW 
Committee, acquisition of advanced aircraft, and procedural changes in the ROKN. The 
USN’s role has been to support the ROKN by not giving them the tools for ASW, but 
instead by aiding in the development of its own capabilities. Although this takes much 
longer and requires more effort, in the long run a ROKN-developed ASW doctrine will 
enable its forces to unilaterally deal with the KPN submarine threat, as U.S. subsurface 
forces dwindle down to their lowest levels in the coming future and returning to its 
current level in about twenty years.226 Additionally, due to the relatively small size of the 
Korean theater of operations (KTO) any action by the KPN submarine force is likely to 
be met directly by the ROKN ASW forces with USN forces arriving at a later date, 
further emphasizing the need for a ROKN ASW doctrine for its forces. The only 
exception to rapid USN involvement would be if U.S. submarines were already in the 
KTO for exercises or routine port visits. Even still, this would only add one additional 
submarine to the list of friendly submarines against the North’s inventory of over 70 
submarines. Creating solid ROKN ASW capabilities is critical to holding off and 
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preventing the creation of a second front deep in the South by North Korean SOF in the 
event of a full-scale invasion of the South.  
Complicating matters in defending against the KPN threat is the regime’s 
awareness of its advantages in numbers over the ROKN ASW forces. If faced with the 
overwhelming number of KPN surface and subsurface units at the same time, not all of 
the initial wave of KPN units may make it past ROKN defenses, but it is also safe to 
assume that a sizable number of KPN units will make it through. This assumption may be 
part of the calculus for the KPN in maintaining such large inventories of maritime units. 
This may also be the reason for the ROK government’s decision to purchase and expand 
ASW aircraft and ships. Technological superiority and parity in numbers of ASW assets 
should enable the ROKN to counter the KPN subsurface forces. Upon arrival of USN 
ASW forces in the KTO, the ROKN-USN ASW team should be able to defeat the KPN 
subsurface threat and establish sea control to maintain the SLOCS open.  
C. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR USN-ROKN UNDERSEA COOPERATION 
Many ROKN-USN initiatives are underway to improve the security situation on 
the Korean Peninsula today. Various foreign military sales programs, intelligence 
sharing, and extensive military engagements constantly occur between the two forces. 
Undoubtedly, unilateral research and experiments to improve ASW capabilities should be 
occurring as well. While it is unknown if the United States or South Korea have any 
desires for joint research and development, one area of cooperation in the future could be 
in the technology field. With the rapid pace of the technological innovations occurring all 
around the world, combining undersea innovation efforts between the two countries may 
prove beneficial to both sides. Specific areas of cooperation that could boost ASW 
capability, specifically for the undersea domain for the future, may be joint technology 
projects in systems like SOSUS-type wide-area search sensors, UUVs, and underwater 
wireless communications.  
Of course, for any kind of coordination to occur, both parties involved need to be 
willing and able. Additionally, some sort of benefit, other than just defeating a common 
adversary (DPRK), would need to be identified for both sides to willingly share the latest 
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and best military technology with each other. Additionally, because the projects are 
subsurface focused, advocates will encounter significant resistance in the United States, 
rooted in its norms of total secrecy and protection of undersea forces and technology. 
Such joint ventures would also face criticism from the United States in general, due to the 
perception that the ROK has more to gain from the joint undertakings. This, however, 
may not be the case; both sides would benefit greatly from such joint endeavors, 
especially in the UUV and undersea wireless communications area, given the USN’s 
eagerness to exploit the financial and tactical advantages of drones. Assuming no 
restrictions on the sharing of information and technology, it may be worth exploring 
some of the advantages and disadvantages for both sides of such joint research and 
development.  
Wide-area search capability is critical for successful ASW operations. The USN 
developed and used SOSUS sensors to maintain situational awareness against Soviet 
submarines during the Cold War. So, in this specific case, it would seem as though the 
South has more to gain than the United States. However, in times of reducing numbers of 
subsurface units for the USN, a ROK controlled SOSUS-type system would enable a 
close ally to establish a clear subsurface picture. This, in turn would improve ROKN 
ASW, while also reducing the need for U.S. submarine presence in that part of the region. 
The units could be used elsewhere, where subsurface control needs additional support. 
The end state would be to share the duties of promoting submarine norms, safety, and 
awareness in the region with the ROKN. Ultimately, sharing some of the responsibilities 
should alleviate the need and desire for U.S. submarine presence, freeing the boat(s) for 
other operations. 
Another area of potential coordination may be in unmanned underwater vehicles 
(UUVs). The United States Navy has always been keen to incorporate new technology 
into its operations. With improvements in autonomous UUVs and battery technology, the 
navy is incorporating UUVs in the subsurface domain. The Navy’s investment in the 
technology is captured by a Navy Times article: “And now, the service has taken its next 
step in embracing the rapidly growing technology with the standing up of its first 
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underwater drone squadron.”227 UUVs present an economically pragmatic method of 
providing coverage in areas of the world for the USN, especially with the steadily 
decreasing number of its fast attack submarines. James Holmes explains that “unmanned 
vehicles [are not the] cure-all for everything that ails a cash-strapped navy…but their 
potential is worth tapping to the max.”228 The U.S. underwater drone squadron will 
assume an increasing role in the subsurface fight as the command and technology 
matures. Joint research between the two navies could shorten the long timelines 
associated with technology integration into both navies.  
Unmanned vehicles could provide significant advantages for the ROKN. South 
Korea is technologically advanced enough to build and operate its own fleet of UUVs. 
Chosun Ilbo explains that in 2011 the ROK Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime 
Affairs sponsored new projects focusing on underwater wireless communications as well 
as deep-sea robotic submarines.229 The newspaper also confirmed use of remote-
controlled underwater vehicles in recovery operations as in the Sewol ferry disaster in 
2014.230 A fleet of UUVs strategically positioned in the waters off the Korean Peninsula 
could serve as the wide area search sensor providing the much-needed early warning of a 
KPN submarine intrusion south of the NLL. UUVs within attenuation range of signals 
from other UUVs could create a daisy chain of sensors to relay information. Furthermore, 
with autonomous operations, the UUVs can be pre-programmed to surface and transmit 
information alerting and cueing shore-side commands of intruding submarines. It is 
unclear if the ROKN has initiated any UUV programs for its navy, but it is clear that the 
civilian sector is employing them. Additionally, Admiral Jung Ok-kun, a former ROKN 
Chief of Naval Operations, stressed the importance for the ROKN to “obtain unmanned 
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and C4ISR [command, control, computer, communications, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance] capabilities in the 21st century security environment.”231 Although 
he did not specify UUVs, his comments confirm the top leadership’s vision of exploiting 
the advantages of unmanned vehicles in the future.  
Joint or individual efforts in the UUV or Autonomous UUV (AUV) platform 
areas by the United States and the ROK could provide significant benefits to both sides. 
The technology involved with such platforms and systems is undoubtedly sensitive, but, 
from the U.S. perspective, it will not be the first time for such collaboration. A Defense 
Daily article brings to light an “announcement made by the Japanese Defense Ministry 
[in 2014] to conduct a month-long U.S.-Japan combined research effort toward an 
unmanned underwater surveillance vehicle.”232 Again, while the sensitivities associated 
with such platforms may dissuade full collaboration between the two countries, joint 
research may alleviate financial and technical challenges associated with UUVs. 
Collaboration may also shorten the timeline to acquiring fully operational AUVs that 
meet military requirements. Underwater wireless communications are another area 
yielding significant technological challenges.  
One last area of potential coordination that could benefit both navies is in the 
creation of a subsurface network of communications. A breakthrough in underwater 
communications would plug the submarines into the robust network of sensors and 
platforms in the ASW fight. For example, if the submarine is able to receive targeting 
data for enemy forces or maritime strike missions without having to transmit from 
periscope depth, it would enable the submarine to maintain its stealth, especially if the 
submarine was close to enemy shores. Additionally as Admiral Richardson commented in 
reference to the increasing challenges of anti-access and aerial denial (A2AD) 
environments, “networked undersea forces will act as a key to unlock the door for 
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decisive force to enter the fight and seize and maintain the initiative.”233 Due to the 
submarines’ nature of operating underwater, they are able to operate relatively freely in 
an enemy A2AD environment, making them the perfect platform to penetrate into enemy 
territory and eliminate the threat, thus opening the gates for the rest of the friendly forces 
to enter the battle area.234 Similarly in the Korean Peninsula, this same network could 
serve as the wide-area search system providing locating data for KPN submarines. The 
ROKN ASW commander could then choose the best platform he has available to 
prosecute the enemy. With the KPN submarine force possessing more than three times 
the number of submarines compared to the South, the importance of obtaining accurate 
locating data cannot be over emphasized. One potential system for such a network is the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) innovation called the Seaweb, which Barbara 
Honegger explains as an underwater sensor network that “[integrates] autonomous sensor 
systems into coherent networks to provide timely and relevant information.”235 As with 
the other two areas, possible coordination in this field also depends on the U.S. desire and 
ability to share the technology due to its sensitive nature.  
The question going forward is how much information and technology the United 
States is willing to share with the ROK. Admiral Um Hyun-seong, ROKN Chief of Naval 
Operations, says that “ROK-U.S. information sharing on North Korean submarine 
capabilities and combined ASW exercises with the U.S. Seventh Fleet and Third Fleets 
will greatly enhance the ROKN’s ASW capabilities.”236 But he is only talking about 
operational information vice technological information. South Korea’s shipbuilding and 
military industries are robust and will eventually build systems like SOSUS and AUVs 
that can improve ASW, but collaboration with the USN could significantly reduce the 
timeline. As mentioned above, the United States is already selling platforms and other 
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sensitive technology, such as for ballistic missile defense (BMD), to the South. It is 
unclear, however, if the USN is ready to start sharing subsurface technology with its ally. 
The U.S. submarine force is, in particular, very secretive about its submarine technology 
and operations even within its own navy organization. Clay Moltz illustrates the navy’s 
reluctance in sharing its secrets: “While the United States sold a large number of surplus 
World War II submarines, the U.S. government implemented strict export controls over 
nuclear submarine technology…and kept its ASW techniques secret.”237 The U.S. 
government has since changed its mind on ASW and techniques are now being shared 
with the ROKN as depicted by the ASW charter. But submarine technology remains 
tightly regulated. In light of recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, to include the 
ROKN’s desire to build nuclear submarines, it would be interesting to consider whether 
U.S. nuclear submarine-related technology should become available for sale to the 
ROKN. Sharing nuclear technology with its allies is not unprecedented, as Moltz notes: 
“The United States considered providing nuclear submarine technology to the 
Netherlands, Canada, and France in the late 1950s during the Eisenhower 
administration.”238 If KPN subsurface threats continue to worsen and with the different 
efforts in progress between the two navies with ASW, it would be interesting to see if 
more detailed and enhanced levels of ASW tactics, techniques, and procedures would get 
shared with the ROKN. However, even with the increasing tensions in the Korean 
Peninsula, it is doubtful that any submarine technology-sharing agreements like the one 
between the United States and the United Kingdom would occur with South Korea.239 
The one wildcard is the current U.S. administration’s perception of the DPRK threat. 
President Donald Trump has stirred up quite a bit of controversy around the world with 
his rhetoric of exterminating the North, should it make an attack on the United States. 
With such rhetoric, coupled with growing evidence of the North possessing a missile 
capable of reaching the continental United States, the possibility of United States sharing 
or sale of nuclear-submarine technology cannot be ruled out entirely. With a strong 
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industry and experience in building submarines and nuclear power plants the ROK may 
not need much assistance in building its own nuclear-powered submarine should it decide 
to do so. Additionally, it would not be impossible for the ROKN to work with the 
Russians for nuclear submarine technology if nothing could be worked out with the 
United States—as the ROK has done in the space-launch field—(assuming the ROKN is 
seeking such assistance).240  
D. POSSIBLE ROK-USN-JMSDF UNDERSEA COOPERATION  
One last area of possible cooperation in the region might be ROKN, USN, and 
JMSDF cooperation in the fight against KPN subsurface threats. On the surface, this may 
be portrayed as political suicide from for the ROKN in terms of domestic politics, but the 
benefits to the ROKN ASW could be significant. The JMSDF submarine force operates 
18 very capable diesel submarines; a fleet of U.S. P-3C, P-8, and Japanese P-1; an 
armada of ASW capable surface ships; and a robust ocean surveillance system that could 
potentially play a role in defending against a common KPN submarine threat.241 The 
Japanese assets would instantaneously double the number of friendly ASW forces going 
against the archaic KPN submarines, but this is only likely to happen during combat 
situations. The more likely capability provided by Japan in a peacetime setting is 
indications and cueing of KPN subsurface threats in the East Sea (or Sea of Japan) from 
its vast network of ocean surveillance systems.242 This type of information exchange 
between the two navies could occur quietly, away from political scrutiny, while 
improving relations between the two countries. Similarly, submarine exercises including 
ROKN, JMSDF, and USN submarines could be another way of improving 
interoperability amongst the three countries, which face common threats from North 
Korea. Trilateral exercises including the three navies have occurred in the past as a 
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response to the North’s continued nuclear and SLBM tests.243 These could later evolve 
into something bigger, should China or Russia present similar threats in the future. 
Submarine exercises also provide the advantage of avoiding political scrutiny because 
submarine activities out at sea are unknown to many and shared with only a select few. 
Plenty of other exercises like the U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and Pacific 
Reach (PACREACH) set precedents for future trilateral submarine exercises under a 
common goal.  
The DPRK’s continued nuclear, missile, and SLBM tests serve to strengthen 
Japan’s pursuit of a shift away from its pacifist post-war posture. As the DRPK continues 
to lob ballistic missiles over Japan, it is forcing the Japanese to take a defensive stance. 
The dangers associated with North Korean missiles flying over Hokkaido not only 
illustrate the North’s disregard for international norms, but its likely ability to hit Japan 
with its missiles. This has to reinforce the perception of the North Korean threat among 
average Japanese citizens. This gives the newly-re-elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
who is an avid anti-DPRK activist, more of a reason to push for Japanese military reform. 
The timing for military coordination between Japan and South Korea, although it will 
require overcoming some political hurdles, may be ripe. Initiatives like the Defense 
Trilateral Talks (DTT) and General Security of Military Information Agreement 
(GSOMIA) are positive indications for further cooperation in the future.244  
One certainty is that ASW remains a weakness for the South, which the ROKN is 
taking steps to amend. Due to the nature of ASW being a platform- and manpower-
intensive capability, the most pragmatic approach, for not just the ROKN but for the USN 
as well, is to share the burden with allies. South Korea and the United States, who will 
end up fighting side-by-side should hostilities resume, have real incentives to share the 
burden of ensuring interoperability and maintaining subsurface awareness at all times. 
Establishing undersea dominance by the combined submarine forces is critical to 
ensuring timely participation of USN aircraft carriers in the war off the Korean 
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Peninsula.245 The question is if the USN is willing to share, and to what extent, 
subsurface information and technology that it currently holds secretly, even within its 
own military. As nice as it would be to improving security conditions on the Korean 
Peninsula, the sharing of U.S. submarine and subsurface technology still may be too 
provocative an idea for the unforeseeable future. All hope is not lost, however, as some of 
the ASW weaknesses can be made up by other means of cooperation with the United 
States and Japan. Even if it starts with just the sharing of sensor information among the 
three countries, that alone would lay the groundwork for further integration, prodded 
along by North Korea’s continued provocative nuclear and missile tests.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Security risks on the Korean Peninsula continue to cause serious concerns in the 
region. Recent nuclear and missile developments by the North Korean regime have 
expanded a security problem previously limited to the region out to the Western 
Hemisphere. The DPRK regime hopes to target the United States with an inter-
continental ballistic missile, but still requires a credible re-entry vehicle. As experts focus 
on the threats posed by these nuclear and missile developments, the KPN subsurface 
threats remain a problem for the ROKN and the USN. The KPN’s fleet of aging 
submarines present a very real threat that was realized with the sinking of the ROKN 
corvette Cheonan in 2010. While the technology of the KPN’s boats is outdated 
compared to the highly advanced and capable ROKN submarines, they are sufficient to 
split a ROKN combatant ship in half and freely travel through ROKN territorial waters 
without getting detected. If challenged one-on-one against the ROKN’s Son Won-Il class 
submarines, the KPN boats do not stand a chance. But, as with all other KPN capabilities, 
the combined power of their massive inventory of subsurface assets can create an 
overwhelming threat. The North has proven it can flush its submarines out to sea in less 
than 24 hours. The South has admitted that it does not have the ability to track all of the 
boats simultaneously going out to sea in a combined attack on the South. This is a great 
example of the limits of technology, despite today’s advanced state of innovation. 
Furthermore, even if the ROKN subsurface units were able to track all of the KPN 
submarines underway, it would be a challenge to prevent all of the enemy boats from 
reaching their destinations. The ROKN submarine’s ability to engage multiple KPN 
submarines is limited by the number of torpedo tubes an operator sitting at the fire 
control console has at his disposal. Additionally, the complex shallow water environment 
of the Korean Peninsula presents a challenging problem for the South and complicates 
the ROKN’s capability to detect infiltrating KPN submarines.  
Technological advances pose new challenges and potential solutions to the 
subsurface problems around the Korean Peninsula. With more money to address the 
problem than the North, the South has more opportunities to harness the new capabilities 
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that technological innovation brings to the undersea fight. Similarly, the same capabilities 
could be available to the North, however, because of its economic situation the North 
would have to prioritize UUVs over its nuclear and missile programs, which may be too 
big an accomplishment for the KPN. New breeds of UUVs have the potential to 
significantly improve subsurface capabilities to those on either side of the DMZ. UUVs 
are economically pragmatic and covert compared to the bigger and louder diesel 
submarines. Additionally, because no humans are required onboard to operate the unit, a 
higher risk tolerance can be justified in its operations, pushing them further inland to 
obtain better intelligence. UUVs are the perfect vehicles for gathering environmental data 
as well as serving as long-term cueing platforms for detecting KPN submarines venturing 
into South Korean waters. The advantages provided by UUVs over conventional 
submarines, such as cheaper production costs, are surely going to make them a potent 
player in the subsurface fight in the near future.  
Despite heavy sanctions imposed on the North’s economy, Kim Jung Un has 
figured out a way to continue funding his nuclear and missile programs, while acquiring a 
subsurface test platform to continue SLBM testing. However, the KPN faces many 
technological challenges to perfecting a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
capability. Despite the long road ahead for KPN SLBMs, the presence of a ballistic 
missile submarine would raise the security threat on the Korean Peninsula, creating 
concern in the South to counter the new KPN threat. The North’s maintenance of a large 
submarine force and recent experiment with the Gorae class SSB also indicates the 
North’s intentions of continued use of the subsurface domain in the future. 
The ROKN has made significant strides in improving its ASW capabilities. The 
Son Won-Il class submarines are one of the quietest submarines in operation today. Its 
ability to operate submerged without having to snorkel often to recharge its batteries 
almost doubles the endurance of its predecessors. The longer endurance enables the 
ROKN submarine to patrol for a longer period of time to prevent KPN submarines from 
entering its waters. With the experience in shipbuilding and submarine operations by the 
South’s industry, the completely indigenous Janbogo III’s capabilities will only enhance 
the ROKN’s submarine ASW capabilities. Additionally, in conjunction with 
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improvements to its submarines, the ROKN’s purchase of ASW aircraft and 
commissioning of new frigates are likely to step up its ability to defend against KPN 
submarine threats.  
The next step required in improving ROKN ASW is to acquire wide-area 
surveillance capabilities. Well-armed ROKN ASW assets lack the cueing required to 
combat the KPN submarine threat. A SOSUS-type surveillance system constructed in the 
waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula could provide the critical alerts necessary to 
direct its ASW forces for successful prosecution of unidentified submerged contacts. 
Such systems are undoubtedly expensive, but compared to the costs associated with 
building nuclear submarines, they are economically much more pragmatic. The 
subsurface situational awareness provided by a wide-area search system also aids the 
ASW commander in allocating the best platform for prosecution. This is critical for the 
ROKN due to its inferiority in numbers. Combining the whole of its ASW forces, to 
include integration of UUVs and UAVs, could make a significant contribution toward 
improving ROKN ASW in the future. Whatever decision the ROKN makes to take its 
ASW capabilities to the next level, it seems to be well on its way.  
Many options exist for the ROKN to acquire such capabilities. It can choose to 
develop its own capabilities or purchase them from its allies like the United States. The 
latest meeting of President Trump and President Moon showed signs of the latter.246 It is 
questionable how much and what the U.S. government plans to make available to the 
South. The South’s pursuit of its own nuclear-powered submarines carries with it more 
than just a high price tag. It may spark nuclear proliferation within the region, causing the 
JMSDF to obtain one as well. Additionally, if the U.S. government decides to sell or 
share nuclear-submarine technology, it will face significant resistance from the navy, not 
to mention possible other requests from different allies. The benefit of such a sale is that 
it would strengthen the commitment of the two countries in defeating the KPN threat and 
further solidify the U.S. presence in the region. Despite these advantages, however, it 
seems unlikely that sales or sharing of nuclear technology will occur. What seems more 
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likely is some sort of combined effort between the two navies in UUVs or weapons 
systems. Because of the strong relationship between the two submarine forces, it is 
certain the United States will aid the ROKN, but not at the expense of one of its most 
protected secrets, which nuclear-powered submarines are a part of.   
The subsurface vulnerability surrounding the Korean Peninsula remains a 
problem to be solved. It continues to pose a deadly threat to the ROKN and USN, but 
both countries are making strides in the effort to contain and defeat the enemy submarine 
threat if and when required. Much has been accomplished with respect to ROKN ASW—
including in the areas of acquisition, doctrine, policy, and training--since the sinking of 
the Cheonan. Combining efforts with the United States and potentially others, such as the 
JMSDF, may be the next step required to not just contain the submarine threat 
surrounding the Korean Peninsula, but to solving related ASW problems facing the 
United States and its allies in the rest of the region.  
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